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Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 69/39, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

2. The General Assembly encouraged cooperation among and between Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacities in that regard.

3. Furthermore, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures, including national measures, for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and to report to the Assembly at its seventieth session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

4. By a note verbale dated 13 February 2015, Member States were invited to communicate their views on the issue. Similarly, letters dated 13 February 2015 were dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations system. Member States and relevant international organizations were invited to provide executive summaries of their contributions for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General, while their submissions in extenso would be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, if so requested by the Member State or international organization. The replies received are contained in sections II and III of the present report. Replies received after the deadline will be issued as an addendum to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Armenia

[Original: English]
[18 May 2015]

For more than two decades since its independence, the priorities of Armenia in terms of national security and foreign policy have been focused on several core and interrelated issues. Those include enhancing the security of Armenia at home and abroad, promoting peace and international security, combating terrorism and transnational crime in all its forms and tackling the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including securing potentially-dangerous materials from terrorists and affiliated groups.

Armenia fully supports the strengthening of relevant national and multilateral legally binding instruments with a view to tackling the threat posed by the possible

acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction. Armenia is party to the main international conventions on combating terrorism, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Within the European framework, Armenia has also joined to several conventions, such as the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. All those conventions served as a basis for the adoption of relevant national legislation. The law on combating terrorism of 2005 and the law on combating money laundering and terrorism financing of 2008 are the main pillars of the legislation of Armenia in that area. Simultaneously, related articles on terrorism (217, 259, 388, and 389) were incorporated in the Criminal Code of Armenia. Adherence to and compliance with those vital instruments and their implementation tools create a solid ground for countering terrorism, including the acquisition of hazardous materials by terrorist groups.

Armenia welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1540 (2004) and supports its full implementation. Since the adoption of that resolution, Armenia has introduced a number of measures for its comprehensive implementation. In particular, the system for controlling the export of military and dual-use commodities has been completely reformed through the adoption of new laws, sublaws and administrative guidelines. With the assistance of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and experts from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a national action plan for 2015 to 2020 was adopted by the Government of Armenia on 5 February 2015.

The Government of Armenia attaches great importance to the full implementation of the instruments of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relevant to nuclear security and safety. Much attention is paid to the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. In 2013, the Parliament of Armenia ratified the Amendment of 2005 to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The adoption of government decree No. 985-A on 13 September 2013 on the appointment of competent authorities for the implementation of obligations set in that Amendment followed. In December 2014, a team of IAEA experts conducted a two-week International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in Armenia. The mission reviewed the country's nuclear security-related legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities, as well as the security arrangements in effect for the transport of radioactive sources. The team also reviewed the physical protection systems at the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant and at three facilities where high-activity sources are used or stored. The team concluded that nuclear security in Armenia is robust and that important progress has been made in enhancing it since a previous mission in 2003. The team also identified several good practices in the national nuclear security regime and at the visited facilities. At the same time, it made recommendations and suggestions for further improvements in nuclear security.

Armenia recognizes the contribution made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism within the scope of its mandate.

Bahrain

[Original: Arabic]
[15 May 2015]

Additional counter-terrorism measures should include the following:

(a) States should take urgent action to combat the spread of terrorism via social media, which are being exploited by terrorist elements for the purposes of recruitment, propaganda and the dissemination of pernicious fatwas falsely presented as Islamic. States should establish specialized units to monitor such terrorist sites and raise awareness among citizens of how dangerous they are. They should also try to identify their users, call them in for questioning and coordinate with social networks to block terrorist sites.

(b) Lessons should be learned from the experience of certain States, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that have established reform and rehabilitation centres for persons returning from combat zones.

(c) States should establish a joint database for the exchange the names of individuals, groups and organizations that perpetrate terrorism.

National measures against any groups belonging to the organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that may appear in Bahrain are based on the following categorization:

(a) Fighters who are still in combat zones;

(b) Persons who have returned from combat zones;

(c) Persons who intend to go;

(d) Persons who engage in incitement;

(e) Persons who engage in financing.

The Ministry of the Interior of Bahrain has set out the measures to be taken with respect to each category. Bahrain has also established a special office for terrorist crimes that is charged with investigating cases of terrorism.

Canada

[Original: English]
[28 May 2015]

Canada is actively involved in efforts to support the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 69/39 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Canada engages in a number of international forums and agencies that work for the prevention of the acquisition by terrorists of weapons and materials of mass destruction, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Criminal Police Organization and the World Health Organization. Canada also works with like-minded countries in multilateral frameworks, such as the Nuclear Security Summit process, the Global Initiative to

Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative, and in support of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

As a founding member of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Canada has contributed more than $1 billion since 2002 in concrete projects undertaken through the Global Partnership programme of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. Canada will continue to provide international support through the Global Partnership programme in the thematic areas of nuclear and radiological security, biological security, the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), countering knowledge proliferation and chemical weapons destruction.

Examples of recent projects under the Global Partnership programme include: the provision of pertinent chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) training, equipment and infrastructure to strengthen the capacity of Jordan to prevent, detect and respond to CBRN threats in the region; the provision of a biocontainment laboratory in the Caribbean to detect, diagnose and respond to infectious outbreaks in the region; and voluntary contributions to international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to support programming efforts.

Canada also continues to implement a variety of national measures towards the objectives of resolution 69/39, including minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium where economically and technically feasible, repatriating highly enriched uranium originating from the United States of America and reinforcing physical protection at installations throughout the country.

Canada remains convinced that international cooperation remains a cornerstone to the success of all counterproliferation efforts and, as such, Canada strongly encourages all Member States to remain active in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and knowledge.

El Salvador

[Original: Spanish]
[13 April 2015]

Regarding resolution 69/39, "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", of 2 December 2014, the Armed Forces of El Salvador, in conjunction with the National Civilian Police and the Attorney-General of the Republic, has implemented several domestic and border security plans with a view to preventing the illegal entry of weapons of mass destruction and keeping them out of the hands of terrorist groups.

India

[Original: English]
[26 May 2015]

India has co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 69/39 entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" to highlight the concerns of the international community with regard to weapons of mass destruction

terrorism. International response to this threat needs to be at the national, multilateral and global levels.

India recognizes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is a major challenge facing the international community and it has supported global efforts for preventing that proliferation. As a victim of terrorism for over three decades, we are fully cognizant of the catastrophic dangers that transfers of weapons of mass destruction to non-State and terrorists could entail. Clandestine proliferation networks have led to insecurity for all and must not be allowed to reappear. The international community must join hands in eliminating the risks relating to sensitive materials and technologies falling into the hands of terrorists and non-State actors. The focus on non-State actors should in no way diminish State accountability in combating terrorism, dismantling its support infrastructure or curbing its linkages with weapons of mass destruction.

India has taken steps to prohibit access to weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and non-State actors through measures at the national level as well as participation in international cooperative efforts. India has in place a well-established, stringent and effective export control system based on legislation, regulations and a control list of sensitive materials, and equipment and technologies consistent with the highest international standards. India is committed to maintaining effective national export controls and is prepared to make its contribution as a full member of the relevant multilateral export control regimes.

India supports enhanced international cooperation, including through the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other relevant forums, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. India participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Summit processes. We see the Summit process as aimed at building pragmatic and purposeful frameworks setting benchmarks and standards and fostering confidence in international cooperation to supplement, and not substitute, the central role of existing multilateral institutions such as IAEA. India believes that the primary responsibility for ensuring nuclear security rests at the national level, but national responsibility must be accompanied by responsible behaviour as well as sustained and effective international cooperation. It is essential that all States should scrupulously abide by their international obligations. India published a handbook on nuclear security in India in March 2014.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[9 April 2015]

Lebanon wishes to reiterate the following:

- Lebanon possesses no weapons of mass destruction and is in compliance with United Nations resolutions prohibiting the use or acquisition of such weapons by terrorists.
- Lebanon has introduced laws and regulations that allow for the monitoring of the export, transit and cross-border movement of weapons of all kinds,

prohibit trafficking in such weapons, and prosecute any terrorists. Lebanese law prohibits terrorism and provides for the prosecution of terrorists.

- Lebanon supports closer cooperation between States and has contributed to international counter-terrorism efforts. It has put in place strict deterrent legislation concerning the surveillance and prosecution of any terrorists.
- Lebanon is combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and is also working to curb armament, with a view to establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Moreover, Lebanon is opposed to the threat or use of such weapons.
- Lebanon condemns all forms of terrorism and participates in concerted and collective international counter-terrorism efforts.
- Lebanon expresses grave concern that Israel's failure to comply with international law poses a threat to all countries in the region.

Oman

[Original: Arabic]
[26 June 2015]

The Sultanate of Oman has put in place numerous national measures to prevent unauthorized parties from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction or materials related to their manufacture. In coordination with other competent agencies, the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Issues has played a pivotal role in that area. In order to handle hazardous radioactive or chemical materials, a licence must first be obtained for their import, export, transfer, storage or use. Entities that use such materials receive field visits, and storage facilities are searched in order to verify compliance with regulations. Workers who handle those materials must obtain a permit subject to technical requirements.

In order to underscore its genuine efforts in that regard, Oman joined the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2009. It has signed numerous relevant instruments, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Weapons of mass destruction pose a threat to international security irrespective of their possessor, and their acquisition by terrorist groups creates a particular danger. It is therefore appropriate to reaffirm the need to rid the Middle East of such weapons, without prejudice to the legitimate right to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Oman emphasized that point in its statement at the general debate of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly in 2012.

Portugal

[Original: English]
[8 May 2015]

Portugal is party to the main international legal instruments that aim to put an end to the traffic of weapons and other means and devices that could represent a threat to international peace and security. Portugal is party to or a member of, inter alia, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction launched by the Group of Eight, the Australia Group and the Outer Space Treaty, and it supports the entry into force of the fissile material cut-off treaty and the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones. In that context, Portugal deposited its instrument of ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in September 2014. Portugal fully complies with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Portugal has also become party to several legal instruments, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1979, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing of 1997 and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999.

Earlier in 2015, Portugal adopted resolution No. 7-A/2015 of the Council of Ministers, by which it approved a national strategy to combat terrorism, which includes in its objectives of detecting, preventing and responding measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The Portuguese authorities stress the importance of international cooperation for enhancing the process for assessing the threat of use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and highlight the importance of the European Union CBRN Action Plan adopted by the Council of the European Union in December 2009 as a framework for carrying out the main actions to prevent and fight against terrorism.

With regard to the prevention of procurement of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, Portugal, as a member State of the European Union, is committed to the legislation adopted on that subject. Portugal also implements regulation (CE) No. 428/2009 of the Council of the European Union, dated 5 May 2009, which sets up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items.

In its national law, decree law No. 436/91of 8 November 1991 also establishes restrictive measures for controlling the import and export of goods that may affect national strategic interests related to dual-use items.

Sudan

[Original: Arabic]
[22 May 2015]

The Sudan reaffirms its strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as one of the most serious threats to peace and security. It supports measures aimed at eliminating international terrorism and threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. The Sudan highlights its commitment to support efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all States and respect their territorial integrity and political independence, and to ensure that States refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It supports the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of justice and international law; the right to self-determination of peoples that remain under colonial domination or foreign occupation; non-interference in the internal affairs of States; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; respect for equal rights for all without distinction on the basis of race, gender, language or religion; international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian nature; and the fulfilment in good faith of the commitments undertaken by States. The Sudan reaffirms that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group.

The Sudan acknowledges that international cooperation and any measures taken to prevent and combat terrorism must be consistent with international law. It supports strengthened coordination and cooperation among States in combating crimes that could be connected with terrorism and, in particular, as regards measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It calls for intensified national efforts and cooperation at the bilateral, subregional, regional and international levels, as appropriate, to improve border monitoring and customs controls in order to prevent and detect the movement of terrorists and illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological materials.

The Sudan will spare no effort to discharge its duties as an effective member of the international community to prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. To that end, it has signed and ratified a number of instruments, such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It has also undertaken to bring national legislation into line with the requirements of those agreements and to take practical steps to improve border monitoring and customs controls. The Sudan also reaffirms its conviction that the best solution lies in the total elimination of those deadly weapons.

Ukraine

[Original: Russian]
[25 May 2015]

Despite experiencing serious socioeconomic difficulties as a result of aggression by the Russian Federation and the illegal armed groups it supports, which are at the epicentre of the most severe crisis in the world order, Ukraine has not relaxed its efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Action in that regard is the responsibility of the Ministry of Energy and Coal, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate, the Security Service, the State Export Control Service, the administration of the State Border Service and other State bodies.

Ukraine continues to fulfil its international obligations regarding physical protection and guarantees for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Protocol Additional thereto, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.

In connection with the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, and the start of the armed confrontation in the Provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, the State system of physical protection was placed on high alert in early 2014. As a consequence of the loss of control over nuclear materials in the temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula, a special report was submitted to IAEA pursuant to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the rest of the territory of Ukraine, the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material has been implemented fully and IAEA safeguards have been applied to all nuclear material, in accordance with that Agreement.

As a result of ongoing Russian aggression, it is no longer possible for the Ministry of Energy and Coal of Ukraine to cooperate with enterprises, institutes and organizations engaging in nuclear energy-related activities on the Crimean peninsula, in particular with Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry.

It should be noted that IAEA, pursuant to the statute of the Agency and international law, continues to apply safeguards to nuclear material and facilities located in the territory of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. IAEA has officially reaffirmed its recognition of Ukraine's jurisdiction over nuclear sites and materials in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

Nevertheless, the matter of Ukraine's implementation of its international obligations regarding the physical protection and safeguards of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials located in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol can be considered only after the de facto restoration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as administrative and territorial units of Ukraine.

In this regard, Ukraine reaffirms its full compliance with the IAEA broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Ukraine is being used exclusively for

peaceful purposes, with the proviso that this conclusion does not apply to the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which have been annexed temporarily by the Russian Federation.

In accordance with an order of the Ministry of Energy and Coal of Ukraine, State enterprises, institutions and organizations whose activities are coordinated and regulated by the Ministry are not active in the area where counter-terrorism operations are being carried out in the Provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Nevertheless, the use of nuclear material or radioactive waste from the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry in these territories cannot be ruled out. This increases the risk of radiological contamination there and the harmful impact of ionizing radiation on the population and the environment.

In Ukraine, the illicit manufacture of nuclear explosive devices or devices that release radioactive material or ionizing radiation gives rise to criminal responsibility. Provisions aimed at combating nuclear terrorism were incorporated into the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine in connection with the ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Ukraine continues to implement a mechanism to prevent the export of goods that may be used for terrorist or other illegal purposes.

The State Border Service of Ukraine takes measures to prevent attempts to transport nuclear and radioactive materials across the border of Ukraine. The Service deploys fixed and mobile radiation monitoring systems, ensures the radiation safety of its staff and provides for skills development.

III. Replies received from international organizations

Financial Action Task Force

[Original: English]
[17 February 2015]

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental policymaking body that sets internationally recognized standards (the FATF Recommendations) and encourages the implementation of policies to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation. All 34 members of FATF and all members of the eight FATF-style regional bodies (over 195 countries and jurisdictions in total) have committed at the ministerial level to implementing the FATF Recommendations and undergoing a mutual evaluation (peer review) of compliance with those standards.

FATF recommendations 2 and 7 are specifically aimed at combating proliferation financing and helping countries to implement relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Under those recommendations, countries are required:

- To ensure that the relevant policymaking and operational authorities have effective mechanisms to cooperate and coordinate domestically on the development and implementation of policies and activities to combat money-laundering, and the financing of terrorism and proliferation

- To implement targeted financial sanctions (asset freezing and prohibitions on making funds available) to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council relating to proliferation and its financing.

FATF assesses and rates both technical compliance and effectiveness through its mutual evaluation process. The technical compliance assessment determines whether a country has implemented an appropriate legislative framework and has competent authorities with adequate powers and procedures. The effectiveness assessment considers how well the country's system works in practice, by judging the extent to which 11 immediate outcomes are being achieved.

Immediate outcomes 2 and 11 assess the extent to which the country:

- Understands its money-laundering and terrorist-financing risks and, where appropriate, coordinates actions domestically to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation.
- Is preventing persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from raising, moving and using funds, consistent with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

FATF has robust mechanisms to take follow-up action and encourage countries to take the necessary action to address deficiencies in their systems.

FATF recently began its current round of mutual evaluations. The first two mutual evaluation reports of the round (for Norway and Spain) were published in October 2014. Both reports are publicly available on the FATF website (www.fatf-gafi.org), as are two guidance papers aimed at assisting countries in their implementation of the FATF Recommendations and resolutions of the Security Council relevant to combating the financing of proliferation: the "Best Practices Paper to Recommendation 2" and "The Implementation of Financial Provisions of UNSCRs to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction".

International Atomic Energy Agency

[Original: English]
[27 May 2015]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has continued to assist States through the implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan for 2014-2017.

During 2014, 10 States ratified, accepted or approved the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Agency organized one regional and two national workshops to promote adherence to and implementation of the Amendment.

The Agency completed three International Nuclear Security Advisory Services and undertook three International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions. New guidelines for such missions were published as IAEA Services Series 29, with modules on the nuclear security regime for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, transport, security of radioactive material and associated facilities, and information and computer security, and new sections on nuclear material accountancy and control.

The Nuclear Security Guidance Committee met twice to review and approve drafts of, and proposals for, nuclear security guidance publications, and to review safety standards on subjects in which there are identified interfaces between safety and security. The Committee also agreed on a plan for publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

The Incident and Trafficking Database has continued to expand. As at 31 December 2014, 128 States participated in the Database. A total of 188 incidents were reported between 1 January and 31 December 2014.

Two meetings on information exchange were conducted to promote cooperation among organizations and initiatives relating to nuclear security. The Border Monitoring Working Group and the Working Group on Radioactive Source Security each met once.

During 2014, 17 member States formally approved and finalized their Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans, while an additional 10 member States with existing Plans held joint review meetings with the Agency. Seventy-one member States nominated points of contact for the Nuclear Security Information Management System, which will allow the Agency, upon request by member States, to provide a self-assessment tool and, subsequently, a more tailored approach to address nuclear security needs.

International Civil Aviation Organization

[Original: English]
[29 May 2015]

In its efforts to promote the counter-terrorism objectives set out in General Assembly resolution 69/39 entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regularly reviews the global aviation security framework of Standards and Recommended Practices to ensure it is adapted and proportionate to the threat posed to civil aviation. Such reviews include the assessment of the risks associated with the sabotage of aircraft or their use as weapons of mass destruction.

In keeping with its mandate to continuously and proactively strengthen the global air cargo and mail secure supply chain, ICAO has joined forces with the World Customs Organization to address the issue of advance cargo information with a goal of identifying consignments deemed of high risk before they could be loaded onto commercial aircraft.

Recognizing the potential use of chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) weapons by terrorists to sabotage aircraft, ICAO has undertaken to examine the States' contingency plans and collect CBR-related information from the various agencies concerned in order to explore and identify possible mitigating measures. While preventing the acquisition of CBR weapons can be challenging, mitigating the effects of a CBR attack may deter terrorists from carrying out such attacks. In addition, the work undertaken by ICAO in securing the operation of remotely piloted aircraft systems will ensure that appropriate security measures are implemented to prevent terrorists from using such aircraft (and their ever-increasing payloads) as weapons of mass destruction.

Amendment 14 to annex 17 (Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation became applicable in November 2014. It includes revised and new provisions necessary to address the vulnerabilities in the global aviation security framework. Those provisions have been designed to either deter or prevent acts of unlawful interference, particularly in relation to the threats posed by insiders and landside attacks.

Acknowledging that man-portable air defence systems may be acquired by terrorists to target aircraft and aviation infrastructures, ICAO is engaged in various international assistance initiatives to support efforts in mitigating that serious threat. ICAO is also considering strengthening its aviation security framework in that regard to better address the threat globally.

International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology

[Original: English]
[27 May 2015]

Through the agreement entered by the United Nations and the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology in April 2001, the latter has actively collaborated along the years with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs on issues directly related to weapons of mass destruction, and in particular biological weapons. That has resulted in the preparation of a document depicting the "building blocks" that could be taken into account by competent authorities for the elaboration and promulgation of codes of conduct for scientists working in life sciences, as well as in a number of events dedicated to biosecurity, which were either directly organized by the Centre or in which the Centre actively participated.

During the past year, that has materialized in the participation in a conference in support of implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), organized by the Government of Germany, in Wiesbaden, in December 2013, and in a workshop on biosecurity and resolution 1540 (2004), co-organized by the Centre, in India, in August 2014.

The latter workshop was supported by the Department of State of the United States and co-organized by the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies and the Centre, on the Centre's campus, in New Delhi, with the objective of: (a) informing Indian scientists of how to achieve biosecurity, at the institutional as well as laboratory levels; and (b) promoting the adoption of, and compliance with, the comprehensive international non-proliferation framework established in resolution 1540 (2004). By achieving those two objectives, the organizers consider that there would be less probability of terrorist groups being able to secure scientific expertise or to access cultures of pathogenic bacteria and viruses in India.

Forty-eight scientists and government officials participated in the workshop, divided into sessions that covered subjects ranging from an introduction to biosecurity to explaining the purposes and requirements of resolution 1540 (2004). All participants concurred in recommending that similar activities be held in future for scientists throughout India and that interdisciplinary teams work to develop an effective regulatory system to achieve biosecurity in India.

While a possible follow-up to that event is being discussed among officials of the Centre and of the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, our organization maintains its involvement in that domain and welcomes the possibility of establishing direct collaborative links with Governments and with other intergovernmental institutions to achieve a wider dissemination of the concepts of biosecurity, taking advantage of its wide network of scientists.

International Maritime Organization

[Original: English]
[29 May 2015]

The instruments of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) relevant to General Assembly resolution 69/39 of 2 December 2014 and Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) are:

(a) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf of 1988 and the corresponding Protocols of 2005;

(b) Chapter XI-2 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, and part A of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, which was adopted in 2002 and entered into force on 1 July 2004.

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code focusses on the protection of port facilities and ships through preventive measures to deter and detect unlawful acts, primarily addressing physical security, control of access and security procedures. The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and Protocol thereto of 2005 make it illegal in international law to attack ships or platforms fixed on the continental shelf, including offences relating to acts of terrorism on board ships, the carriage of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist fugitives, criminalize their transportation and introduce provisions to enable the boarding of vessels on the high seas pursuant to such offences.

IMO has developed and implemented a comprehensive global technical cooperation programme in support of its maritime security regulations and guidance, which focuses on assisting States in the implementation and verification of, compliance with and enforcement of the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, as well as the long-range identification and tracking of ships for enhanced maritime situational awareness.

IMO has forged strong links with the United Nations and international and regional partners in the delivery of technical cooperation projects for maritime and border security, and it has participated in numerous in-country needs-assessment missions with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate of the United Nations in connection with resolution 1373 (2001), in which IMO serves as the maritime component of a multi-agency United Nations law enforcement and supply chain security team, also comprised of representatives of, inter alia, the World Customs Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization and

the International Civil Aviation Organization. Such multi-agency visits include discussions with senior government officials about the implementation of the IMO maritime security measures and the identification of areas where IMO might provide technical assistance.

League of Arab States

[Original: Arabic]
[6 May 2015]

Below is a summary of the actions that have been or will be taken by the League of Arab States to implement General Assembly 69/39 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction:

The League of Arab States and a delegation representing the Group of Counter-Terrorism Experts of the European Union held consultations on 29 October 2014 to explore means of fostering cooperation between the League and the European Union with regard to counter-terrorism, in general, and preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in particular.

On 19 November 2014, the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice adopted resolution No. 1012, which calls for enhancing cooperation with specialized international organizations in order to obtain the assistance needed to build the capacities required to respond to the threat of use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction or the components thereof. It furthermore calls for enhancing security at airports, ports and borders and calls on Arab States to step up national efforts and measures to adopt and enforce laws aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or their components. The League Secretariat circulated that resolution to all Arab States and called on them to implement its provisions.

As part of the ongoing cooperation between the League of Arab States and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the steering committee of the Regional Programme for Drug Prevention, Crime Control and Criminal Justice Reform for the Arab States (2011-2015) met from 15 to 17 December 2014 at League headquarters. The meeting addressed the question of elaborating and implementing a regional border-monitoring initiative, with a view to countering organized crime and terrorism.

On 2 December 2014, the Secretary-General of the League held a meeting at League headquarters with the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator of the European Union. They discussed several counter-terrorism-related matters, including preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

On instructions from the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, work is underway on the drafting of an Arab guide on national legislation and bilateral and multilateral instruments concerning terrorism. This guide will be an important tool in furthering the efforts of Arab States to develop and update their legislation and to harmonize it with international instruments, including those relevant to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The League of Arab States and the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs organized a conference on regional security and the challenges facing the Arab region, which was held in Cairo on 23 and 24 February 2015. The conference urged the competent authorities at the League of Arab States to develop effective security

mechanisms that would prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of any kind, particularly weapons of mass destruction.

In its resolution No. 7882 of 9 March 2015, the Council of the League at the ministerial level called on countries to take measures at the national level to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It also called on States to cooperate with one another and with the relevant regional and international organizations in order to strengthen national capacities in that regard, and furthermore called on those Arab States that had not yet ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism to complete the measures required to ratify or accede to that Convention.

A workshop will be held in the second half of 2015 on developing and strengthening border surveillance and security systems in order to prevent the illicit trade in and the inter-State movement of arms and ammunition for use in the commission of acts of terrorism.

The technical secretariat of the Group of Arab Counter-Terrorism Experts is coordinating with the Ministry of Justice of Iraq to hold specialized training workshops on all aspects of counter-terrorism, including the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.

The League of Arab States is of the view that the most effective way to implement the resolution on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is to continue cooperation efforts, provide technical assistance and redouble efforts to make the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The League of Arab States intends to continue to play a central role in promoting the implementation of the resolution and to that end will provide its full support to all Arab States.

Oceania Customs Organisation

[Original: English]
[14 May 2015]

The Oceania Customs Organisation acknowledges that the linkage among terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the acquisition of materials (chemicals or other) that can potentially be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction is a serious threat to global security in general and to regional security in particular.

A majority of the organization's members are characterized by small customs administrations that lack capacity in all respects of administration and management of their large and open-sea borders, thus increasing the level of vulnerability to cross-border criminal activities without detection.

Against that backdrop, the organization's strategy has been to work with the customs administrations of its members in implementing a number of initiatives at the national level that are aimed at enhancing their capacity to achieve border security outcomes for themselves as well as for the Pacific region as a whole. Those initiatives are:

(a) Guiding administrations to enhance national cooperation in the management of security issues domestically;

(b) Establishing basic infrastructure for the sharing and exchange of information among customs administrations on the movement of people and their conveyances;

(c) Reviewing and revising enabling legislation that provide authority to national administrations to deal with any general border security issues as well as issues related to terrorism;

(d) Coordinating with international organizations such as the World Customs Organization (WCO) to collaborate on any international strategies for dealing with terrorism and to work with non-WCO members in the region to implement such strategies.

An important development that the organization has proceeded with has been the emphasis placed on its members to implement the 2012 version of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, which can assist in the recording of statistical information on importations into individual countries, especially statistics with respect to the quantity and type of chemicals and materials, which may be used to identify whether such imports can potentially be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction.

The organization also maintains the Customs Regional Intelligence Network, publishes a half-yearly bulletin based on reports submitted by the customs administrations of its 24 members, manages specific reporting on imports into their jurisdictions of chemicals or materials that can potentially be used in terrorist-related activity and provides reports on activities that may be linked to terrorism.

Despite the efforts made, the capacity needs of a number of the members' customs administrations remain largely strong given the emphasis placed by a number of national Governments on trade, revenue collection and economic growth, rather than on security concerns at their borders.

Organization of American States

[Original: English]
[6 May 2015]

The main objective of the programme of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) is to raise overall awareness and to identify the specific needs and challenges of member States with regard to the physical protection and accounting of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and other needs related to the implementation of that resolution.

Specifically, the Committee contributes to the delivery of tailored capacity-building activities aimed at strengthening the preventive framework of member States against the use of CBRN materials by non-State actors. Since 2011, the Committee has been assisting Mexico and Colombia with working towards compliance with resolution 1540 (2004) by supporting them with the drafting of their national action plans, which were officially submitted to the Expert Group of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in the last quarter of 2014, as well as with the official launching of both plans that same year.

In addition, the programme, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the 1540 Committee, facilitated the exchange of international best practices concerning licensing patterns and risk-assessment methodology, as well as the development of interministerial coordination strategies to prevent and detect cases of proliferation and the use of weapons of mass destruction linked to terrorist attacks at borders and customs posts.

With regard to legislative assistance, the programme assisted in the drafting of the law of strategic commerce and the law on the freezing of assets intended for terrorism financing and weapons of mass destruction, as well as identified legislative gaps in the federal penal code, the federal criminal procedural code and the federal law on weapons and explosives in relation to criminal offences and liability linked to terrorism, terrorism financing and the use of weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, it aided in the implementation of the sanctioning regimes in the Mexican commercial laws, pursuant to the recent accession of Mexico to the membership of the export control regimes of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Moreover, the programme worked to promote contacts with other countries to perform peer reviews of resolution 1540 (2004). Thus far, informal contacts have been made among Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Chile. A Mexican official participated as an expert in the official launch of the national action plan of Colombia on 6 November 2014. Finally, the programme held a meeting in Panama with relevant authorities regarding the drafting of their country's national action plan.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

[Original: English]
[15 May 2015]

During the reporting period, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) continued to assist Member States with the ratification and implementation of the international legal instruments dealing with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, in accordance with the mandate received from the General Assembly.

In December, UNODC conducted a workshop in Bangkok on the promotion of the ratification and the implementation of the Amendment of 2005 to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism for selected Asian and Pacific island countries.

During the reporting period, and in the context of several of its projects, UNODC reviewed the CBRN-relevant legislation of several Member States, including Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Philippines, upon their request.

UNODC continued its close cooperation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Expert Group, and participated in several of its activities, including the workshop on promoting full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) held in Seoul in October 2014 and the

seminar on effective practices of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) held in Rakitje, Croatia, in June.

UNODC participated in, and contributed to, several initiatives and meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including various nuclear security information exchange meetings, and three workshops on the Amendment of 2005 to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material held, respectively, in Mexico City in April, in Vienna in June and in Belgrade in July.

In May, UNODC contributed to a regional dialogue for prosecutors on nuclear smuggling cases, held in Tbilisi and organized by the United States of America.

As an official observer to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, UNODC participated in its implementation and assessment group meeting held in Seoul in July.

UNODC also participated in several meetings of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and briefed members of the Partnership and participating international organizations on its work in preventing CBRN terrorism.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

[Original: Russian]
[27 May 2015]

In accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 69/39 of 2 December 2014 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) promotes the coordination of cooperation among the competent bodies of the States members of SCO to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their possible use for terrorist purposes.

All SCO member States are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and also cooperate under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

The outcome documents of SCO summits invariably state that SCO has consistently advocated the strengthening of cooperation, including through the strengthening of the international legal regime concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the framework of the 2013-2015 programme for cooperation among SCO member States in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism and the annual workplans of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure Executive Committee, measures are being taken to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their components, their means of delivery and technologies for their manufacture.

In accordance with the 2008 agreement on cooperation among the Governments of the SCO member States in combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, consistent efforts are made to enhance the legal framework for cooperation and to harmonize the legislation of the SCO member States in the area of combating illicit trafficking in weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. A coherent strategy and joint measures are being developed to

combat illicit trafficking in weapons, and information on lessons learned in organizing and carrying out joint operational and investigative activity in this area is exchanged, including through the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure's secure database.

Under Decision No. 365 of the Council of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, adopted on 19 September 2014 to promote international cooperation among the competent bodies of SCO member States in combating international terrorism, the Structure's Executive Committee has access to the unclassified information segment of the international counter-terrorism database.

The States members of SCO, in accordance with national legislation and in strict observance of international law, are taking measures for the physical protection of strategic, critical and sensitive sites housing materials that could be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction. With that in mind, and in order to maintain the required level of preparedness of the relevant capabilities, the competent bodies of SCO member States continually carry out counter-terrorism exercises in which early action procedures are developed for identifying and neutralizing threats from terrorist organizations.

The SCO member States continue to take steps to accede to international legal regimes for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Legislation in effect in the SCO member States facilitates the effective implementation of a set of preventive and legal measures designed to detect, prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including those involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.

World Customs Organization

[Original: English]
[11 May 2015]

The main initiative of the World Customs Organization to counter the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction goes under the name of the Strategic Trade Controls Enforcement Project. The objective of the Project is to help member States of the organization to implement effective border controls, as outlined in the Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

The Project consists of three different key activities. Those are the production of a comprehensive customs-training curriculum on strategic commodities, the organization of six regional seminars to prepare an international law enforcement operation and the organization of a law enforcement operation to prevent and detect illicit trafficking of strategic goods.

The production of a comprehensive customs-training curriculum on strategic commodities is well under way. The curriculum includes materials on how to set up specific strategic trade controls enforcement programmes within customs, and how to train front-line officers to identify commodities and materials of concern. The Project's implementation guide, which presents policy guidance on the matter, is available to customs administrations and the general public through the organization's website. The accompanying training materials are currently being drafted and most of them have already been made available to the organization's

members for consultation. The remaining modules will be finalized and delivered to members by March 2016.

The six regional workshops to raise awareness about strategic trade controls were conducted in 2014. They addressed the various good practices and challenges that customs administrations encounter at the front line when pursuing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

Operation Cosmo was conducted from 1 May 2014 to 31 March 2015. The operation was the first-ever global operation of the World Customs Organization in the field of strategic goods. The objective of the operation was to prevent and curb the trafficking of strategic commodities in international supply chains. Eighty-nine member States of the organization participated in the operation and several hundred messages were globally exchanged about high-risk consignments. The exchange of messages and cooperation among countries led to several seizures and investigations, as well as promoted the facilitation of legitimate shipments. The final report of the operation will be made available to the global customs community in October 2015.

In addition to the Strategic Trade Controls Enforcement Project, the organization has been implementing Programme Global Shield, a counter-improvised explosives device initiative, to curb the illicit movement of chemicals for explosives. Some of the chemicals can be used in "dirty bomb" types of devices, bringing a linkage with Global Shield and the organization's work to counter weapons of mass destruction.

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General and complete disarmament

Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 69/46, the General Assembly reaffirmed the ways and means regarding confidence- and security-building measures set out in the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1993 session, and it called upon Member States to pursue those ways and means through sustained consultations and dialogue, while at the same time avoiding actions that might hinder or impair such a dialogue. Furthermore, the Assembly urged States to comply strictly with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements, to which they are a party. The Assembly emphasized that the objective of confidence-building measures should be to help to strengthen international peace and security and to be consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, and encouraged the promotion of bilateral and regional confidence-building measures, with the consent and participation of the parties concerned, to avoid conflict and prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities. It requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Assembly at its seventieth session containing the views of Member States on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. A note verbale was sent on 9 February 2015 to all Member States requesting their views. The replies received at the time of reporting are contained in section II. Any additional replies will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Chile

[Original: Spanish]
[29 May 2015]

Regional context

(a) Organization of American States (OAS), annual report on:

(i) Notification of imports and exports, submitted pursuant to the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (resolution AG/RES. 1284 (XXIV-O/94));

(ii) Transfer of small arms and light weapons (resolution AG/RES. 1284 (XXIV-O/94));

(iii) Military expenditure in standardized and simplified format (resolution AG/RES. 1284 (XXIV-O/94)).

(b) Union of South American Nations (UNASUR):

(i) Annual report on:

- Organization, functions and procedures of Ministries of Defence
- Data on military forces: troops, weapons and equipment
- Register of transfers and acquisitions of conventional weapons and equipment in accordance with United Nations standardized reporting

- Register of the full texts of intraregional and extraregional cooperation agreements on defence and security
- Defence expenditure
- National defence budget in all its stages
- National systems for marking and tracing weapons

(ii) Requests for clarification on defence issues;

(iii) Notice of military manoeuvres, deployments or exercises in countries within or outside the region;

(iv) Invitation to military observers from UNASUR countries to military exercises with countries within or outside the region;

(v) Communication mechanism between border military forces to coordinate and announce activities.

Subregional context

(a) With Argentina:

(i) Political consultations between the Ministers of Defence of Chile and Argentina;

(ii) Mechanism for 2+2 dialogue between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defence;

(iii) Argentine-Chilean Permanent Committee on Security (COMPERSEG);

(iv) Combined Joint Peacekeeping Force "Cruz del Sur" and "Cruz del Sur" Exercise;

(v) Combined Joint Peacekeeping Force "Cruz del Sur" Bilateral Group for Political Dialogue, which meets in the context of COMPERSEG meetings;

(vi) Combined participation in peacekeeping operations in Cyprus;

(vii) "Solidarity" working-level exercise for natural disaster response;

(viii) Bilateral Working Group for Cooperation in Science, Technology and Production for Defence, which meets in the context of COMPERSEG meetings;

(ix) Ad hoc Working Group on Mining Matters in the Border Area.

(b) With Peru: Defence and Security Committee.

(c) With Brazil: Bilateral Defence Group.

(d) With Colombia: Chile-Colombia Strategic Political Dialogue.

(e) With Ecuador:

(i) Bilateral Defence Group;

(ii) Joint Engineering Corps in Haiti, which consisted of engineers from the Chilean army and members of the engineering corps of the Ecuadorian army.

(f) With Honduras:

(i) Combined participation in peacekeeping operations in Haiti;

(ii) Cooperation programme in Central America.

(g) With El Salvador:

(i) Combined participation in peacekeeping operations in Haiti;

(ii) Cooperation programme in Central America;

(iii) Support from Chile for the preparation of the first Salvadorian defence white paper.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[23 March 2015]

Global, regional, subregional and national efforts are relevant and necessary to build confidence among States.

In this regard, confidence-building measures are of great value as a contribution to international peace and security.

Confidence-building is a step-by-step process that requires consensus among the participating States.

Cuba not only supports confidence-building measures at all levels, as appropriate and on a voluntary basis, but also considers it necessary to strengthen, improve and expand them because of their valuable contribution to the promotion of understanding, transparency and cooperation among States, as well as to the enhancement of stability and security and the facilitation of disarmament measures.

The adoption of confidence-building measures which fully respect the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and enjoy the consent and participation of the parties concerned can help to avoid conflict, prevent the unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities and contribute to regional stability and the achievement of development objectives, including the eradication of poverty and protection of the environment.

Because they are voluntary in nature, confidence-building measures cannot be imposed; nor are there any one-size-fits-all solutions. The success of such measures will depend to a large extent on achieving genuine consensus among the States participating in their implementation. They must be tailored to the geographical, political, social, cultural and economic conditions of each region.

Although the implementation of confidence-building measures can help to create an enabling environment for the implementation of disarmament commitments and their verification, such measures can in no way be a substitute for arms control and disarmament measures and existing regional and subregional treaties in that area, nor are they a precondition for their implementation.

The existence of more than 16,000 nuclear weapons, of which approximately 4,000 are in operational status, and the unjustifiably high levels of global military expenditure, which amounted to over $1.75 trillion in 2013, are factors that create a climate of mistrust and legitimate international concern.

At least half of current military expenditure should be allocated to the establishment of a fund administered by the United Nations to meet the economic and social development requirements of countries in need.

Cuba welcomes the proclamation of the Latin American and Caribbean region as a zone of peace at the second Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, held in Havana on 28 and 29 January 2014, by means of which member States reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, in order to banish forever the threat or use of force in our region.

In this context, Cuba highlights that States with greater military capabilities bear a major responsibility with regard to confidence-building measures.

To the extent possible, on the basis of consent and without any impact on the national security of the respective countries, measures should be taken to promote mutual understanding between the armed forces of the region and ensure greater transparency in all possible areas. States with more powerful armed forces should guarantee that they will not attack smaller countries.

The above will be possible to the extent that States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion.

For the establishment of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, tensions in the region or subregion concerned must be reduced and cooperation must be enhanced so that any situation, however complicated it may be, can be resolved peacefully through negotiation. For example, in the area of border monitoring, an appropriate system of communication between contiguous States is needed in order to avoid possible sources of conflict, taking into account the proximity of States and the confluence of ships, aircraft and other units in adjacent areas.

Under certain conditions of reduced tension, and on a voluntary basis, the implementation of measures such as the following could be considered:

(a) Provide advance notice of all exercises and manoeuvres that take place in the region, especially those involving the movement of forces and equipment by sea and by air in areas close to other countries;

(b) Adopt measures for the gradual reduction of forces and equipment involved in such exercises; reduce live-fire activities with long-range weapons systems that could hit unintended targets at sea, on land or in the air;

(c) Provide notification of airspace and sea space reservations for the purposes of such exercises or other military activities. Such notification should take place through the established channels and reach all interested parties sufficiently in advance;

(d) At the time of approval of exercises and manoeuvres of a certain scale, explain their objectives, the tactical and operational issues involved and the numbers of forces participating;

(e) When possible, invite military representatives from the countries in the region to participate as observers in some events or manoeuvres forming part of these exercises;

(f) Conduct the combat training activities of the armed forces at a prudent distance from the coasts or borders of other countries, unless the latter are

participating in those activities or give their prior consent to the party conducting them. Particularly important are aviation activities in areas close to other countries, which are a significant risk;

(g) Reach agreements to ban exercises and manoeuvres in areas where there are intensive commercial, fishing, tourism, scientific research or other activities;

(h) Provide advance notice of the use of warships (especially aircraft carriers and amphibious units) in areas close to other countries, in groups or in isolation;

(i) Establish an advanced notification system for when units of this type cross passages or straits where there is intense traffic, including the Yucatan Canal, the Florida Straits and the Windward Passage;

(j) Establish limits in specific areas for the presence of nuclear-powered ships, as well as more severe restrictions for ships and aircraft with the capacity to carry nuclear arms;

(k) Install hotlines between Governments and military commanders of the countries of the region, so that any urgent situation that arises can be resolved in a timely manner;

(l) Organize bilateral and multilateral contacts and events on a regular basis for specialized personnel in order to improve relations between military forces in the area and to create a climate of mutual confidence in the military sphere;

(m) Particularly important would be issues relating to military bases of other countries in the region. Initial measures could be taken on the status of such facilities. Those facilities that are present against the will of Governments and peoples in the area, and that infringe the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation where they are situated, among other factors, should be withdrawn.

The implementation of confidence-building measures should take place in such a manner as to ensure the right of each State to undiminished security, guaranteeing that no individual State or group of States obtains advantages over others at any stage of the confidence-building process.

Respect for international law, compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and international treaties, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the sovereign equality of States, respect for the sovereignty of States, non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs, renunciation of the threat or use of force, cooperation among States in solving international and regional problems, respect for the self-determination of peoples, and fulfilment in good faith of obligations assumed are the basis of peaceful coexistence and international security and constitute the indispensable framework for the development of truly effective confidence-building measures.

Our country recognizes the importance of efforts to reduce possible political or military tensions, conflicts or confrontations and establish stable relations of cooperation in all spheres of international relations.

Confidence-building measures should contribute to the establishment of favourable conditions for the peaceful settlement of disputes and existing international problems and for the enhancement and promotion of international relations based on justice, cooperation and solidarity.

Germany

[Original: English]
[29 May 2015]

The Federal Republic of Germany, referring to its contribution of 2014 to the database on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms (in relation to resolution 69/63), attaches great significance to confidence-building measures in disarmament and arms control, and emphasizes the importance of such measures at the regional and subregional levels.

Germany is a party to or has participated in the following treaties, agreements and activities relating to confidence-building measures, at the regional and subregional levels:

(a) The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;

(b) The Treaty on Open Skies;

(c) The Vienna Document;

(d) The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);

(e) The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Accords), annex 1B;

(f) The OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons;

(g) The OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition;

(h) The OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers.

Latvia

[Original: English]
[15 June 2015]

Latvia is fully committed to confidence-building measures in the regional and broader European context. Those measures, when fully implemented, contribute to transparency and predictability, and therefore help to build trust among States. In order to promote those principles, Latvia has joined and vigorously implements relevant arms control instruments, including on a bilateral basis, and has proposed regional confidence-building measures regarding military air and maritime activities in the region. Latvia considers that bilateral and multilateral measures are mutually reinforcing and that their synergy can be utilized to create conditions for transparent and predictable relations among States.

In 2014, Latvia, together with Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, presented a statement on military maritime and air traffic to the First Committee of the General Assembly. The statement proposed concrete confidence-building measures, such as making use of on-board transponders and advance sharing of route plans when military activity is taking place in the exclusive economic zone of another country or in the international airspace in immediate proximity to the borders of other countries. Latvia believes that such measures could improve transparency and the overall climate of trust between States, in particular in the Baltic Sea region.

Latvia has adopted the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and signed the Treaty on Open Skies, which establishes a regime of unarmed observation flights over the territories of the States parties. In 2004, Latvia signed a bilateral agreement with Belarus, in accordance with chapter X of the Vienna Document 1999. That agreement provides opportunity for both parties to conduct annually an additional arms control inspection and evaluation visit. In addition, the bilateral agreement sets out transparency measures regarding military exercises and establishes a format for expert consultations on arms control issues. Since its adoption, the bilateral agreement has been implemented in a responsible and cooperative manner by both parties.

While recognizing that the effectiveness of confidence-building measures largely depends on the political will of States, Latvia remains interested in engaging in further measures both on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Latvia will continue to promote the development and the implementation of best practices in the fields of maritime and air traffic. Latvia also supports the efforts to modernize the existing arms control instruments and has proposed signing another bilateral agreement under the Vienna Document.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[1 April 2015]

The Ministry of National Defence wishes to state that Lebanon supports all international initiatives and conventions aimed at building confidence, preserving the military balance and combating the untrammelled proliferation of various forms of weapons in the region and the world. That trend poses a serious threat at the regional, subregional and national levels. Lebanon is committed to international law and the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the equal sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. The main obstacle facing Lebanon with regard to confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context is Israel, which has continued to violate international laws and norms and possesses weapons of mass destruction that pose a constant threat at the local and regional levels.

Portugal

[Original: English]
[20 April 2015]

At its sixty-ninth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context, recalling the resolutions and guidelines adopted by consensus by the Assembly and the Disarmament Commission relating to confidence-building measures, urged States to comply strictly with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements, to which they are party.

Portugal considers that confidence-building measures are a key element in improving and reinforcing peace and security, a major input for regional stability and an important way to prevent conflicts, at the international, regional and subregional levels.

In that context, Portugal publishes an annual report on international trade in and the intermediation of defence equipment. Portugal also collects national data on the export of conventional weapons, which it submits to the European Union in its annual report, and reports to the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Wassenaar Arrangement. In 2014, Portugal was among the first 50 countries to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty, and it plays an active part in the promotion of its universalization. Portugal also reports on confidence-building measures in the framework of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Portugal publishes annually its military budget, which is available to non-governmental organizations and think tanks, and fully cooperates with the requests that are presented in relation to it.

Furthermore, with regard to the export of weapons, Portugal implements a strict national legislation and fully complies with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of the Council of the European Union, which sets forth common rules for all member States of the European Union. Those rules include the respect for international and regional embargoes, regional stability and, especially, human rights.

Spain

[Original: Spanish]
[29 May 2015]

The ultimate goal of any system of arms control or confidence- and security-building measures should be to prevent conflict by reducing the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation with regard to the military activities of other countries, taking steps to impede covert military preparations, reducing the risk of surprise attacks, and reducing the risk of the outbreak of war by accident.

From that perspective, confidence- and security-building measures within a regional or subregional context are of great value as a form of prevention specifically adapted to that context, given that they involve a smaller number of parties and can therefore be more stringent, tailored to the local situation, and, thus, more effective. All of the foregoing makes such measures easier to adopt and implement.

Within its own regional sphere, Spain has actively participated in all relevant initiatives; it is a party to the Treaty on Open Skies and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which include a number of legally binding measures. Moreover, as a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it is politically bound by the measures contained in the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (which was updated in 2011 with the aim of improving and broadening its implementation), as well as by other OSCE documents. Moreover, Spain has contributed to the implementation of the Agreement on Regional Stabilization established by annex 1-B to the Dayton Agreement regarding the former Yugoslavia.

Ukraine

[Original: English]
[28 May 2015]

Ukraine fully shares the vision of the General Assembly in its resolution 69/46 of 2 December 2014 and recognizes the importance of the role and objectives of the confidence-building measures laid down therein.

Ukraine remains consistently committed to the objectives of strengthening security for all, including through effective confidence- and security-building measures. Therefore, Ukraine supports all pan-European, subregional and complementary bilateral confidence- and security-building measures, whether past, present or future, and advocates expanding the scope of their application. In the light of the aggression that has unexpectedly become possible even in a conciliated Europe, it also favours tightening the coercive and obligatory level of those measures to preclude any repeat of what has happened to Ukraine.

The still not eradicated possibility of aggression, while raising concerns over the effectiveness of confidence- and security-building measures, also underscores the potential value of such measures when countries comply with their commitments and obligations and implement them fully and in good faith. In particular, the crisis in and around Ukraine is yet another reminder of the urgent need to improve those measures in order to strengthen them, so that they better address the existing security issues in their areas of application.

The aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine stresses the advisability of taking into account, during the design or improvement of those measures, such tasks as lowering the thresholds for notification, increasing opportunities for verification activities, expanding the range of military activities subject to notification, modernizing and updating the exchange of military information, strengthening the risk reduction mechanisms and considering possibilities to enlarge the scope of the measures. Those are tasks requiring a responsible approach, which should take into account cost-effectiveness and the further improvement of the overall level of implementation.

The example of the aggression by the Russian Federation, which has challenged the very essence of trust and confidence embodied in the confidence- and security-building measures, also compels us to a periodic assessment of the relevance, strengths and weaknesses of the politico-military instruments used by participating States.

Ukraine has been a long-standing responsible party to such pan-European, subregional and complementary bilateral confidence-building mechanisms, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Treaty on Open Skies and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, and an active participant in their modernization. Additionally, Ukraine has had very positive experiences of deepening confidence-building through the use of separate bilateral intergovernmental agreements on confidence- and security-building measures in border areas, as encouraged in the Vienna Document. Ukraine entered into such agreements with neighbouring Poland in 2004, Hungary in 1998, Slovakia and Belarus in 2001 and Romania in 2015. Regular inspection activities and meetings of the parties to those agreements are aimed not so much at compliance verification, but mostly at the enhancement of military contacts and mutual relations

in the interest of incrementally strengthening and complementing a bilateral, subregional and European confidence- and security-building process. Regrettably, the numerous proposals made in the past by Ukraine to enter into similar agreements with the Russian Federation were rejected by the Russian side under the pretext of a strategic partnership between the two countries, whose true nature was entirely revealed by the aggression by the Russian Federation. Also, regrettably, the unacceptable behaviour of the Russian Federation has undermined the viability of such regional confidence-building arrangements among the littoral States of the Black Sea, such as the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group and confidence- and security-building measures in the naval field.

Ukraine is confident that the strong commitment of all participating States to fully implementing and further improving and extending confidence- and security-building measures is essential for enhancing military and political stability within the respective regions. It is, however, a great challenge to ensure that the contracted obligations are respected even by non-democratic regimes.

Ukraine believes that the European experience with confidence- and security-building measures may rightly be regarded as a success story and that the Vienna Document, which has generated a great deal of experience in the field of trust- and confidence-building, can serve as a viable example for similar arrangements in other regions, as those measures could certainly benefit all parts of the world.

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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Report of the Secretary-General

1. In paragraph 11 of its resolution 69/81 entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, to prepare a report on the efforts of States that had ratified the Treaty towards its universalization and on possibilities for providing assistance on ratification procedures to States that so request it and to submit such a report to the Assembly at its seventieth session.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request. Information on the subject provided by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is contained in the annex.

* A/70/150.

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Annex

Report on efforts of States towards the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty[a]

June 2014-May 2015

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
1. Bilateral level			
1 (a) Activities relating to annex 2 States			
Argentina	June 2014-May 2015	Argentina seized every appropriate opportunity to insist on the need for the Treaty to enter into force and promote signature and ratification by the remaining annex 2 States.	
Armenia	June 2014-May 2015	Armenia called upon the non-signatory annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty. It also called upon the annex 2 States that had signed but not yet ratified the Treaty to proceed with ratification in order to ensure its entry into force.	
Belgium	June 2014-May 2015	Belgium, both bilaterally and as a member of the European Union, supported the European Union plan of action and raised systematically in its bilateral contacts with annex 2 States, including at a high level when appropriate, the importance of signing and ratifying the Treaty in order to achieve its early entry into force.	
Brazil	June 2014-May 2015	Brazil took every appropriate opportunity in its bilateral contacts to raise the importance of the signature and ratification of the Treaty with the annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified it. Brazil also raised the issue of Treaty ratification in bilateral consultations on disarmament and non-proliferation with some annex 2 States.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
Bulgaria	June 2014-May 2015	Bulgaria took every appropriate opportunity to raise the issue of the signature and ratification of the Treaty in its bilateral contacts with annex 2 States.	
Costa Rica	June 2014-May 2015	Costa Rica raised the importance of signing and or ratifying the Treaty in order to achieve its entry into force and of completing the build-up of the international monitoring system, in its bilateral contacts with annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified it.	
European Union	June 2014	The European Union raised the issue of the Treaty during the European Union-Pakistan dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament on 16 June 2014 in Islamabad.	
	January 2015	The European Union raised the issue of the Treaty during the European Union-Egypt dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament on 20 and 21 January 2015 in Cairo.	
	April 2015	The European Union raised the issue of the Treaty during the European Union-Israel dialogue on non-proliferation and disarmament on 14 April 2015 in Jerusalem.	
Finland	June 2014-May 2015	Finland raised the importance of the early ratification of the Treaty by annex 2 States in its bilateral contacts with annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty.	
France	June 2014-May 2015	France took every appropriate opportunity in its bilateral contacts with States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty, including the annex 2 States, to raise the importance of doing so as soon as possible.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
Greece	June 2014-May 2015	Greece, in its bilateral contacts with remaining annex 2 States, stressed the importance of the rapid entry into force of the Treaty.	
Hungary	June 2014-May 2015	In its bilateral meetings at the ministerial level and below, Hungary raised the importance of the entry into force of the Treaty with several annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty.	
Italy	June 2014-May 2015	Italy reiterated the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty in its bilateral talks with annex 2 States.	
Japan	June 2014-May 2015	Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts with the remaining annex 2 States, at both the political and official levels, to encourage the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty.	
Luxembourg	June 2014-May 2015	Luxembourg, both bilaterally and as a European Union member State, supported the strategy of the European Union and, during bilateral contacts, reminded annex 2 States, including high-level representatives when appropriate, of the importance of signing and/or ratifying the Treaty and of its entry into force.	
Mexico	June 2014-May 2015	Mexico constantly promoted the importance of the signature and ratification of the Treaty by the annex 2 States that had not yet done so in order to achieve its entry into force.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
Mongolia	October 2014	The President of Mongolia noted during his meeting on 15 October with the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization that Mongolia attached particular importance to the issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with which it enjoyed excellent bilateral ties, and remained committed to continuing to work actively to engage that country in international talks and dialogue.	
Norway	June 2014-May 2015	Norway continued to raise the issue of signature and ratification of the Treaty in its bilateral contacts with annex 2 States.	
Philippines	June 2014-May 2015	The Philippines took every relevant opportunity in its bilateral engagements with annex 2 States to promote the universalization and entry into force of the Treaty.	
Russian Federation	June 2014-May 2015	The entry into force of the Treaty remained one of the top-priority goals of the Russian Federation's foreign policy. The Russian Federation exerted sustained efforts aimed at the transformation of the Treaty into one of the key elements of the international legally binding security system. The Russian Federation continued to actively promote Treaty matters within its bilateral contacts, especially with the annex 2 States, and advocated for early adherence to the Treaty. The Russian Federation supported the activities of the Group of Eminent Persons, of which the President of the Russian International Affairs Council and former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Igor S. Ivanov, is a member.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
		The Russian Federation rigorously upheld a moratorium on nuclear testing, proceeding at the same time from the fact that, despite the significance of that measure, it could by no means be a substitute for the main aim, namely the entry into force of the Treaty.	
		The prospects for the Treaty's entry into force and the efforts of the Russian Federation on this track were in focus during the meeting on 20 November between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey V. Lavrov, and the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The fundamental line of the Russian Federation's policy is aimed at the facilitation of the entry into force of the Treaty, as well as the readiness to continue the dialogue with the eight remaining annex 2 States.	
Switzerland	June 2014-May 2015	During annual bilateral dialogues with annex 2 States, Switzerland called upon the States to ratify the Treaty.	
Turkey	June 2013-May 2014[a]	Turkey took every appropriate opportunity to promote the Treaty in its relevant bilateral contacts and meetings with annex 2 States and stressed the importance of the entry into force of the Treaty.	
	June 2014-May 2015	Turkey took every suitable opportunity to promote the Treaty and stressed the importance of its entry into force in its relevant bilateral contacts with annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	June 2014-May 2015	The United Kingdom regularly discussed Treaty issues with annex 2 States, including China, Egypt, India, Israel and the United States of America.	
1 (b) Activities relating to non-annex 2 States			
Argentina	June 2014-May 2015	Argentina took advantage of every opportunity to reiterate in all relevant forums the need for the Treaty to enter into force as soon as possible and for all States to adhere to it without preconditions.	
Belgium	June 2014-May 2015	Belgium, both bilaterally and as a member of the European Union, supported the European Union plan of action and raised systematically in its bilateral contacts with non-annex 2 States, including at a high level when appropriate, the importance of signing and/or ratifying the Treaty in order to achieve its universalization.	
Brazil	June 2014-May 2015	During the reporting period, Brazil took every appropriate opportunity in its bilateral contacts to raise the importance of the signature and ratification of the Treaty with non-annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified it.	
Bulgaria	June 2014-May 2015	In its bilateral contacts with non-annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty, including, when appropriate, at a high level, Bulgaria systematically underlined the importance of the Treaty and promoted its early entry into force. As a member of the European Union, Bulgaria supported the European Union's activities encouraging the signature and ratification of the Treaty by non-annex 2 States.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
Costa Rica	June 2014-May 2015	Costa Rica raised the importance of signing and/or ratifying the Treaty in order to achieve its entry into force and of completing the build-up of the international monitoring system in bilateral contacts with non-annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified it.	
European Union	June 2014-May 2015	The European Union systematically raised Treaty-related topics in its political dialogue with countries that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty.	
Finland	June 2014-May 2015	Finland raised the importance of the early ratification of the Treaty in its bilateral contacts with several non-annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty.	
France	June 2014-May 2015	France took every appropriate opportunity in its bilateral contacts with States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty to raise the importance of doing so as soon as possible.	
Greece	June 2014-May 2015	Greece, in its bilateral contacts with the remaining non-annex 2 States, stressed the importance of the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty and its universalization.	
Hungary	June 2014-May 2015	Hungary took every appropriate opportunity in its bilateral contacts to raise with non-annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty the importance of doing so.	
Italy	June 2014-May 2015	Italy took every suitable bilateral opportunity to encourage further ratifications of the Treaty by non-annex 2 States, in particular by carrying out démarches with other States of the Group of Seven.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
Japan	June 2014-May 2015	Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts to encourage the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty by non-annex 2 States, with a special focus on a few countries in Asia.	
Mexico	June 2014-May 2015	Mexico raised the importance of the signature and ratification of the Treaty by the non-annex 2 States that had not yet done so.	
Norway	June 2014-May 2015	Norway continued to raise the issue of the signature and ratification of the Treaty in its bilateral contacts with non-annex 2 States.	
Philippines	June 2014-May 2015	The Philippines took every relevant opportunity in its bilateral engagements with non-annex 2 States to promote the universalization of the Treaty.	
Russian Federation	June 2014-May 2015	The Russian Federation continued to pursue a line aimed at a broad universalization of the Treaty.	
Turkey	June 2013-May 2015	Turkey took every appropriate opportunity to promote the Treaty in its bilateral contacts and encouraged States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty to do so, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia region.	
United Arab Emirates	November 2014	The United Arab Emirates hosted the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, who made an official visit to the United Arab Emirates and engaged in discussions with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan, on further collaboration between the United Arab Emirates and the Preparatory Commission.	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	June 2014-May 2015	The United Kingdom regularly raised Treaty issues, including entry into force and universalization, in its bilateral meetings with non-annex 2 States.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
2. Multilateral level			
2 (a) Global			
Argentina	June 2014-May 2015	Argentina participated in the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to reaffirm at a high level its commitment to the promotion of the Treaty and its early entry into force, as well as the importance of the Treaty as the indispensable means to secure the cessation of nuclear tests. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Hector Timerman, a member of the Group of Eminent Persons, advocated for the early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty, by generating political support and support at the public opinion level. Argentina actively participated in the Article XIV process, endorsing statements urging States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.	
Armenia	June 2014-May 2015	The President of Armenia visited the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna on 12 June 2014. In his meeting with the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission, he conveyed his appreciation for the important work that the Preparatory Commission was continuously doing. He also expressed Armenia's readiness to further develop cooperation with the Preparatory Commission and to assist in any way possible.	
	September-October 2014	Armenia actively engaged in all relevant multilateral forums. Armenia voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions in support of the Treaty.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
Belgium	June 2014-May 2015	Belgium, both in its national capacity and as a member of the European Union, reiterated in various international forums its support for the Treaty and the importance that it attached to the Treaty's early entry into force.	
	September 2014	Belgium associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in New York in September 2014.	
	December 2014	Belgium supported the adoption of General Assembly resolutions in which all States were called upon to ratify the Treaty and joined in sponsoring Assembly resolution 69/81.	
Brazil	June 2014-May 2015	Brazil actively engaged in all relevant multilateral forums to promote the early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty.	
	September 2014	Brazil associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement issued at the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on 26 September 2014.	
	October 2014	In its statement to the First Committee at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Brazil urged all States, in particular those listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, to promptly sign and/or ratify it.	
	December 2014	Brazil voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 69/81, on the Treaty.	
Bulgaria	June 2014-May2015	Bulgaria, both in its national capacity and as a member of the European Union, continued to address the issue of the signature, ratification and early entry into force of the Treaty in the appropriate international forums, including the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
	September 2014	Bulgaria participated in the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.	
	September-December 2014	Bulgaria joined in sponsoring General Assembly resolution 69/81.	
Costa Rica	June 2014-May 2015	Costa Rica raised the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including the early entry into force of the Treaty, in various multilateral forums and events, including the commemoration of the first International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in September 2014, the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in December 2014, and the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.	
	September 2014	Costa Rica participated in the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on 26 September, and associated itself with its Joint Ministerial Statement. Furthermore, Costa Rica made substantive contributions during discussions on the Statement.	
European Union	June 2014-May 2015	The European Union contributed to the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and delivered statements during the meetings of the Preparatory Commission and its working groups.	
	September 2014	The European Union raised the issue of the Treaty in its statement on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea delivered at the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting held in Vienna from 15 to 19 September 2014.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
		The European Union continued to state its political priorities (viz. support for the universalization and entry into force of the Treaty) during the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the informal General Assembly plenary meeting marking the International Day against Nuclear Tests.	
	November 2014	The European Union raised the issue of the Treaty in its statement on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea delivered at the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting held in Vienna on 20 and 21 November 2014.	
	December 2014	The strong support of the European Union for the Treaty was reflected in the European Union member States' collective sponsorship and vote in favour of General Assembly resolution 69/81.	
	March 2015	The European Union raised the issue of the Treaty in its statement on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea delivered at the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting held in Vienna from 2 to 6 March 2015.	
	May 2015	The European Union submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.50) to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in support of the Treaty and its verification regime.	
Finland	June 2014-May 2015	Finland, as a member of the Group of Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, co-organized the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on the margins of the General Assembly and delivered a statement in support of the Treaty.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
France	June 2014-May 2015	As a member of the Group of Seven, France supported démarches to States that had not signed and/or ratified the Treaty to encourage them to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.	
		France supported efforts by the European Union to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty and its universalization, including through the implementation of the European Council decisions on European Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the European Union statement in support of the Treaty at the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.	
		France fully supported the Group of Eminent Persons established to promote the Treaty in annex 2 States. The French member of the Group took part in its work.	
	February 2015	France addressed ratification issues at the P5 Conference in London and supported comments on the Treaty's entry into force in the Conference communiqué.	
	19 February 2015	The President of France, François Hollande, emphasized in a speech on nuclear deterrence that the diplomatic tools and foreign policy of France remain fully mobilized in support of the entry into force of the Treaty as soon as possible.	
Greece	June 2014-May 2015	Greece reiterated in various international forums its support for the Treaty and the importance that it attaches to the Treaty's long due entry into force.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
	September 2014	The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece participated in the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and Greece associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement, urging the signature and ratification of the Treaty.	
Holy See	September 2014	During the 58th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Holy See expressed its support for the initiative focusing on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, specifying that the entry into force of the Treaty and the achievement of a comprehensive outcome at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons represent essential steps towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. The Holy See appealed to Governments and scientific experts engaged in the field of military defence to work with all the possibilities and with conviction towards nuclear disarmament on the basis of due respect for the fundamental rights of all peoples and of mutual trust, through open-minded and sincere negotiations and adherence to contracted obligations by all parties concerned.	
	October 2014	Taking an active part at the meetings of the First Committee at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the Holy See urged all States to sign and/or ratify the Treaty without further delay, noting that it is a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
	December 2014	In his address to the Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria and President of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Sebastian Kurz, His Holiness Pope Francis stated that: "Nuclear weapons are a global problem, affecting all nations, and impacting future generations and the planet that is our home. A global ethic is needed if we are to reduce the nuclear threat and work towards nuclear disarmament." His Holiness also added that nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction could not be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and States and that it was time to counter the logic of fear with the ethic of responsibility, and so foster a climate of trust and sincere dialogue. At the same meeting, the Permanent Observer for the Holy See to the United Nations Office and Permanent Delegate to other international organizations in Geneva, Msgr. Silvano Tomasi, affirmed that it was reasonable to imagine a world where no one has nuclear weapons. In that context he recalled that the Treaty was one of the positive steps that had been made towards that goal.	
	February 2015	With regard to the 2015 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Holy See joined other ratifying States in sending a letter to the Secretary-General requesting him to convene the Conference pursuant to Article XIV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
Hungary	June 2014-May 2015	As a member of the Vienna Group of 10, Hungary participated in the process of drafting a working paper for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the Treaty, among other subjects. Hungary also took part in outreach activities aimed at convincing other States to associate themselves with the paper.	
	September 2014	In its capacity as coordinator of the Article XIV process, along with the Group of Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Hungary participated in the organization of the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on 26 September 2014, as well as in the process of drafting the Joint Ministerial Statement issued at the Meeting and in the outreach activities of the Group of Friends aimed at convincing other States to associate themselves with the Joint Ministerial Statement.	
	April-May 2015	In April 2015, preparations were started for hosting an informal lunch for members of the Group of Eminent Persons at the Permanent Mission of Hungary to the United Nations in New York. The purpose of the lunch-meeting was to take stock of the activities of the Group since its creation and to discuss its meetings planned for 2015.	
		Hungary joined in sponsoring a working paper on the Treaty prepared for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by outgoing and incoming Article XIV coordinators, the Chair of the Preparatory Commission and Australia as co-chair of the Group of Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
Indonesia	8 May 2014[c]	The Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Vienna, representing Indonesia as coordinator of the Article XIV process, participated as a panellist at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Academic Forum panel discussion on the prospect of the entry into force of the Treaty.	
	4 September 2014	The Permanent Representative of Indonesia in Vienna emphasized the importance of the early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty in his presentation as a panellist at the European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference in Brussels.	
	26 September 2014	The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia attended the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and delivered remarks in his capacity as President of the Article XIV conference, emphasizing the importance of early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty.	
Italy	June 2014-May 2015	As a State member of the European Union, Italy supported all relevant European Union statements, positions, initiatives and financial contributions aimed at facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty.	
	June 2014-October 2014	As Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy until October 2014, Federica Mogherini also served as a member of the Group of Eminent Persons, supporting and complementing efforts to promote the Treaty's entry into force.	

State entity	Date/period	Activities and context	Comments
	26 September 2014	Italy attended the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Ms. Mogherini addressed the meeting on behalf of the European Union and, during the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, expressed the European Union's strong desire to make progress with the Treaty's entry into force. Ms. Mogherini also underlined the European Union's continued financial support for the Preparatory Commission, including through significant voluntary contributions. Italy also associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement calling for the entry into force of the Treaty.	
	March 2015	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, jointly with the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei and the European Commission Joint Research Centre, organized the XIX Edoardo Amaldi Conference, dedicated to international cooperation for enhancing nuclear safety, security, safeguards and non-proliferation, which focused in part on the Treaty and its universalization.	
Japan	September 2014	The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fumio Kishida, chaired the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, in his opening remarks, called upon the remaining annex 2 States to take individual initiatives towards the early signature and ratification of the Treaty.	
	October-December 2014	Japan joined in sponsoring General Assembly resolution 69/52 entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". In that resolution, the Assembly urged all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest opportunity, with a view to its early entry into force and universalization. It was adopted with an overwhelming majority voting in favour.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
	January-March 2015	Japan invited seismology experts from developing countries, including several annex 2 States, to the annual training course by the Japan International Cooperation Agency entitled "Global seismological observation", which deals with global seismological observation and its application to nuclear test monitoring technology.	
Mexico	June 2014-May 2015	Mexico actively promoted the early entry into force of the Treaty and the importance of strengthening the verification regime of the Treaty in various multilateral forums.	
	December 2014	Alongside Australia and New Zealand, Mexico was the lead sponsor of General Assembly resolution 69/81, in which the importance of the universalization and the immediate entry into force of the Treaty was stressed. In addition, Mexico joined in sponsoring the biennial resolution on cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.	Resolution 69/81 was adopted with 179 States voting in favour, 1 against (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and 3 abstentions.
Mongolia	September 2014	Mongolia associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement issued at the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.	
	March 2015	At the high-level segment of the Conference on Disarmament, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mongolia called upon all remaining annex 2 States to speedily ratify the Treaty.	
Norway	June 2014-May 2015	Norway provided financial and technical support for the Preparatory Commission's capacity development initiative, which provided, free of charge, training programmes covering all aspects of the Treaty and its verification regime.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
		Norway contributed on a voluntary basis to the Preparatory Commission's pilot project, which facilitates the participation of experts from developing countries in technical meetings of the Preparatory Commission.	
		Norway participated actively in the efforts of Working Group B of the Preparatory Commission, tasked with implementing the verification regime of the Treaty in preparation for its entry into force. Representatives of the Norwegian Seismic Array contributed to the work of the Group and acted as advisers to its Chair.	
	September 2014	The State Secretary took part in the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on 26 September 2014. Norway also associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement.	
	September-December 2014	Norway supported General Assembly resolutions in which all States were encouraged to ratify the Treaty and repeated this plea in national statements in the Assembly, the International Atomic Energy Agency and various other multilateral forums in relation to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.	
	October 2014	In its statements to the First Committee at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Norway stated that the entry into force of the Treaty would greatly strengthen the non-proliferation regime and expressed hope that additional steps would be taken to achieve the Treaty's entry into force.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
	January-May 2015	As a member of the Vienna Group of 10, Norway co-submitted a working paper to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in which all States, in particular annex 2 States, that had yet to sign and or ratify the Treaty were strongly encouraged to do so without delay and to recognize the value of the Treaty for regional and international security.	
Peru	September 2014	Peru associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement issued at the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on 26 September 2014.	
Philippines	June 2014-May 2015	In relevant multilateral forums, the Philippines undertook to include the call for the universalization and entry into force of the Treaty in its national statements and interventions.	
	September 2014	The Philippines associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement issued at the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on the margins of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.	
Russian Federation	June 2014-May 2015	The Russian Federation continued to support the Treaty in the course of proceeding to the completion of preparations for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Russian Federation also expended efforts to constantly emphasize the role of the Treaty within the United Nations and other multilateral forums. At the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the Russian Federation joined in sponsoring resolution 69/81.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
		The delegation of the Russian Federation took part in the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supported the Joint Ministerial Statement. The Russian Federation also took practical steps aimed at the realization of the action plan concerning the Treaty, adopted on 27 September 2013 at the eighth Article XIV conference, and actively participated in the preparations for the ninth Article XIV conference, to be held on 29 September 2015. On the basis of the facility agreement between the Russian Federation and the Preparatory Commission on the establishment of the international monitoring system, as envisaged by the Treaty, the Russian Federation was in the process of concluding the creation of its national segment of the international monitoring system (26 out of 32 planned facilities had already been put into operation). The Russian Federation also continued the development and implementation of the high-efficiency radionuclide noble gas detector, which is a prospective technology that could be implemented in international monitoring system facilities. The Russian Federation actively supported the preparation and conduct of the on-site inspection integrated field exercise held in Jordan in 2014 and considered the successful conduct of the exercise an additional argument in support of the Treaty's early entry into force. Experts from the Russian Federation participated in the exercise.	
Singapore	September 2014	Singapore attended the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in New York on 26 September 2014.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
	December 2014	Singapore joined in sponsoring and voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions 69/52 and 69/81, in which the Assembly called for, inter alia, the entry into force of the Treaty.	
Spain	September 2014	Spain associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement on the Treaty issued at the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on 26 September 2014.	
	December 2014	Spain joined in sponsoring resolutions 69/52 and 69/81, adopted at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.	
Switzerland	June 2014-May 2015	Switzerland called for the entry into force of the Treaty in all its statements in relevant forums.	
	December 2014	Switzerland voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 69/81, in which the Assembly called for the entry into force of the Treaty.	
	April-May 2015	Switzerland participated in the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and noted that the Treaty had still not entered into force.	
Turkey	June 2013-May 2014[d]	Turkey continued to promote the Treaty in appropriate multilateral meetings, especially during the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly and the eighth Article XIV conference, held in New York on 27 September 2013, and called for the ratification of the Treaty by those annex 2 States that had not yet signed and/or ratified it.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
	June 2013-May 2015	Turkey promoted the universalization and entry into force of the Treaty on relevant occasions during the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on a national basis, as well as together with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. Turkey contributed on a voluntary basis to the Preparatory Commission's pilot project, which facilitates the participation of experts from developing countries in technical meetings of the Preparatory Commission.	
	June 2014-May 2015	Turkey continued to promote the Treaty in appropriate multilateral meetings, particularly at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, and called for the signature and/or ratification of the Treaty by those annex 2 States that had not yet done so. Turkey also participated in the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held on 26 September 2014. In demonstration of its firm support for the Treaty's prompt entry into force, Turkey associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement issued at the Meeting.	
Ukraine	June 2014-May 2015	In relevant international forums, Ukraine stressed the importance of the Treaty's entry into force. The universalization of the Treaty remained on the agenda of Ukraine's foreign policy.	
United Arab Emirates	September 2014	The United Arab Emirates highlighted its support for the universalization of the Treaty in a poster at its exhibition during the 58th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
		The United Arab Emirates participated in the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in New York.	
	November 2014	The United Arab Emirates joined a high-level group observation at the largest-ever on-site inspection exercise held by the Preparatory Commission in Jordan, the integrated field exercise for 2014.	
	January 2015	The United Arab Emirates hosted a meeting of senior officials of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, at which the promotion of the universalization of the Treaty was discussed.	
	April-May 2015	The United Arab Emirates supported the entry into force and universalization of the Treaty and jointly submitted a working paper in support thereof at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	June 2014-May 2015	The United Kingdom fully supported all efforts by the European Union to promote the entry into force and universalization of the Treaty.	
		The United Kingdom helped to draft and supported a démarche from the Group of Seven Non-Proliferation Directors Group, under Germany's leadership, calling for the entry into force and universalization of the Treaty.	
	September 2014	The United Kingdom attended the seventh Ministerial Meeting in Support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
	October 2014	The United Kingdom joined in sponsoring a resolution that promoted the entry into force of the Treaty before the First Committee at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.	
		The United Kingdom made a statement to the First Committee at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly supporting the entry into force of the Treaty.	
	February 2015	The United Kingdom addressed ratification issues with China and the United States at the London P5 Conference and reaffirmed its commitment to the entry into force and universalization of the Treaty in the Conference statement.	
2 (b) Regional			
Argentina	June 2014-May 2015	Argentina promoted within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States the ratification and early entry into force of the Treaty and supported its statements in that regard, calling upon States to take all appropriate opportunities to insist on the need for the early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty.	
Belgium	June 2014-May 2015	Belgium, as a member of the European Union, actively supported the relevant statements, positions and contributions of the European Union in support of the Treaty.	
Brazil	June 2014-May 2015	Brazil showed active engagement in the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in efforts to promote the universalization of the Treaty.	Brazil continued to promote the ratification of the Treaty by all Latin American and Caribbean States.

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
		Brazil supported statements of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and of the States members of the Union of South American Nations delivered on different occasions that emphasized the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty and called upon all annex 2 States that had not yet done so to sign and/or ratify the Treaty as a matter of priority. Brazil supported the special declaration of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States on the urgent need for a nuclear-weapon-free world, issued on 29 January 2015, in which all States, especially those listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, were urged to promptly sign and/or ratify it.	
Bulgaria	June 2014-May 2015	As a member of the European Union, Bulgaria supported the implementation of European Council decisions in support of the Preparatory Commission's monitoring and verification system and capabilities and other relevant European Union activities in support of the Treaty and its early entry into force.	
Costa Rica	June 2014-May 2015	Costa Rica promoted the signature and ratification of the Treaty by all Latin American and Caribbean States, particularly through its leading participation in the activities of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and its presidency of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in 2014, including the negotiation and adoption of the special declaration of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States on the urgent need for a nuclear-weapon-free world at the third Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, held in Belén, Costa Rica, in January 2015. In the special	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
		declaration, Heads of State and Government called for the entry into force of the Treaty, urged remaining annex 2 States to accelerate the process of signing and/or ratifying it and asserted that all States must refrain from carrying out nuclear weapon test explosions, other nuclear explosions or any other non-explosive relevant experiments, including subcritical tests, since such actions were contrary to the objective and purposes of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as to the spirit of the Treaty.	
European Union	July 2014	The European Union raised the issue of the need for ratifications of the Treaty by the eight remaining annex 2 States during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, held in Tokyo on 8 and 9 July 2014.	
	December 2014	By adopting Council decision 2014/861/CFSP of 1 December 2014, the European Union extended the period in Council decision 2012/699/CFSP of 13 November 2012 by 12 months to allow for the implementation of the remaining parts of the projects in support of the Treaty and its verification regime.	
	April 2015	The European Union raised the issue of the need for ratifications of the Treaty by the eight remaining annex 2 States during the high-level event held on the margins of the workshop on the theme "On-site inspection integrated field exercise 2014: debriefing and the way forward", held from 12 to 16 April in Ramat-Gan, Israel.	
Finland	June 2014-May 2015	As a member of the European Union, Finland continued its active support for relevant statements, positions and contributions of the European Union in support of the Treaty.	

State entity	Date/period	Activities and context	Comments
France	June 2014-May 2015	As a member of the Group of Seven, France supported démarches to States that had not yet signed and or ratified the Treaty to encourage them to do so as soon as possible.	
Hungary	January 2015	At the 24th African Union Summit, held in Addis Ababa, Hungary, as Article XIV coordinator, distributed a letter signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary and addressed to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of African States that had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty, encouraging the ratification and the early entry into force of the Treaty.	
Indonesia	June 2014-May 2015	Indonesia emphasized the importance of the early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty in various meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, with the main objective of achieving the ratifications of the Treaty by all 10 member States.	
	May 2014[c]	Indonesia hosted the Regional Conference for States in South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East in Jakarta. The Minister for Foreign Affairs opened the Conference and delivered opening remarks emphasizing the urgency of the early into force and universalization of the Treaty.	
	8 August 2014	During the meeting of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Commission held in Myanmar on 8 August 2014, Indonesia encouraged the ratification of the Treaty and made the following statement:	
		"For Indonesia's part, we'd like to highlight two elements in this plan of action, Mr. Chairman. One is encouraging the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Mr. Chairman, you would be aware, if I may indulge, that Indonesia and Hungary are the	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
		co-Presidents of the global efforts towards the early coming into force of the Treaty. And using this platform, or this forum, Indonesia would like to encourage the two remaining ASEAN countries that have yet to ratify the Treaty to do the process of ratification. I am sure it is only a matter of procedural issues rather than a matter of substance. But it would be very constructive if, during Indonesia's co-presidency of this effort, we can add all 10 ASEAN States to those that have completed their ratification of the Treaty."	
Japan	May 2014	The Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nobuo Kishi, participated in the Regional Conference for States in South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East, held in Jakarta from 19 to 21 May 2014, and gave a speech on the significance of the Treaty in the context of global security and in the context of the security of the South-East Asia, Pacific and Far East region.	
Mexico	June 2014-May 2015	At the regional level, Mexico continued to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty. In the framework of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, Mexico endorsed the special declaration on the urgent need for a nuclear-weapon-free world, in which the importance of the signature and ratification of the Treaty was stressed.	
	July 2014	Mexico hosted the first edition of the summer course on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation for diplomats from Latin America and the Caribbean, which addressed Treaty-related issues.	
Mongolia	July-August 2014	Mongolia successfully organized an East Asia regional workshop for national data centres in Ulaanbaatar.	

State entity	Date period	Activities and context	Comments
Norway	June 2014-May 2015	Norway supported a trilateral cooperative project on Treaty capacity-building between the Norwegian Seismic Array, the Institute of Seismology in Kyrgyzstan and the Institute of Geophysical Research in Kazakhstan. The project focused on support for a training centre established in Almaty in 2010 under a previous project, also supported by Norway. Trainees from all five Central Asian countries attended month-long courses on technical Treaty verification, including extensive hands-on training. The project also provided support to the Kyrgyzstan National Data Centre in Bishkek, including technical training, software and hardware. The project is scheduled to run until 2015.	
	September 2014	The State Secretary attended the opening of infrasound station IS37 in Bardufoss, thereby highlighting the fact that Norway had completed its part of the international monitoring system of the Treaty. As a result, all six stations on Norwegian territory were certified and transmitting data to the International Data Centre in Vienna.	
Peru	January 2015	The third Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, held in Costa Rica on 28 and 29 January 2015, adopted the special declaration of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States on the urgent need for a nuclear-weapon-free world, in which States reiterated the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and urged those States in annex 2 to the Treaty, whose ratification is essential to its entry into force, to accelerate the process of signing and/or ratifying the instrument.	

State entity	*Date period*	*Activities and context*	*Comments*
Philippines	June 2014-May 2015	In relevant regional forums, the Philippines undertook to include the call for the universalization and entry into force of the Treaty in its national statements and interventions.	
Romania	June 2014	Romania hosted the Regional Training Course on National Data Centre Capacity-Building: Access and Analysis of International Monitoring System Data and International Data Centre Products under European Union Joint Action V, held from 23 to 27 June 2014. The host institution of the course was the National Institute of Research and Development for Earth Physics. The main goals of the course were understanding the roles of national data centres in the verification regime, building and/or improving national data centre capabilities and providing participants with knowledge and practical experience in analysing international monitoring system data and international data centre products.	The Regional Training Course was attended by representatives from Armenia, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Thailand and Viet Nam.
Singapore	May 2014[f]	Singapore attended the Regional Conference for States in South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East, held in Jakarta from 19 to 21 May 2014.	
Turkey	June 2013-May 2015	Turkey seized every opportunity at the regional level to promote the Treaty and reiterate the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty.	

[a] The present report includes activities that have been completed (i.e. that are not ongoing or planned) and that were aimed at promoting the entry into force of the Treaty.

[b] The reporting period for Turkey's submission includes the period June 2013-May 2014. The original submission received in 2014 was erroneously omitted.

[c] Although this activity occurred outside the reporting period covered in the present report, it is included because it took place after the Preparatory Commission's submission deadline for the report in 2014.

[d] The reporting period for Turkey's submission includes the period June 2013-May 2014. The original submission received in 2014 was erroneously omitted.

[e] Although this conference was held outside the reporting period of the present report, references to it are included because it was held after the Preparatory Commission's submission deadline for the report in 2014.

[f] This was not reflected in Singapore's previous report for the period June 2013-May 2014, as the Regional Conference in Jakarta was held after the Preparatory Commission's submission deadline for the report in 2014.

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Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. On 2 December 2014, the General Assembly adopted resolution 69/28, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security". In paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Assembly invited all Member States, taking into account the assessments and recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (A/68/98), to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions:

(a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;

(b) Efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and to promote international cooperation in that field;

(c) The content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph 2 of the resolution;

(d) Possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level.

2. Pursuant to that request, on 2 February 2015, a note verbale was sent to all Member States inviting them to provide information on the subject. The replies received at the time of reporting are contained in section II. Any additional replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Canada

[Original: English]
[4 June 2015]

Cyberspace has enhanced social interaction and transformed industries and Governments, and continues to be an engine of economic growth, innovation and social development. It has also introduced new threats and challenges to our society.

Canada reiterates the clear affirmation by States in the report of 2013 of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security of the applicability of international law in cyberspace as the cornerstone of norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States, and it encourages future work on peacetime norms.

Canada also believes that addressing the security of information and communications technology must go hand-in-hand with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The same rights that people have offline must also be protected online.

Canada is committed to a free, open and secure Internet by means of the following:

(a) Implementing the cybersecurity strategy and action plan of Canada remains at the forefront of our efforts at the national level. Those help to secure the cybersystems of Canada and protect Canadians online through active engagement with major critical infrastructure sectors (e.g. finance, transportation and energy);

(b) Canada has developed a cyberincident management framework to provide a consolidated national approach to the management and coordination of potential or existing cyberthreats or incidents;

(c) The new anti-spam legislation of Canada assists in clarifying legal rights obligations and the respective duties of government agencies, as well as strengthening legislative provisions for enforcement and international collaboration;

(d) Internationally, Canada has committed $8 million to support cybersecurity capacity-building projects, primarily in the Americas and in South-East Asia. Canada has also provided more than $3.6 million through the Organization of American States (OAS) (2007-2016) to build capacity in OAS countries, including establishing computer security incident response teams. Canada has also joined the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise as a founding member;

(e) Canada supports the efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to strengthen the alliance's cybersecurity and that of individual allies;

(f) Canada works within the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to build capacity on the importance of confidence-building and transparency measures for stability in cyberspace;

(g) Through the cybersecurity action plan between Canada and the United States of America, Canada partners with the United States to enhance the resiliency of our cyberinfrastructure and improve engagement, collaboration and information-sharing at the operational and strategic levels;

(h) Canada also participates in initiatives to combat cybercrime in the Group of Seven, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, OAS and ASEAN, and is a member of the Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online;

(i) Canada recommends that all Member States wishing to enhance cybersecurity and prevent cybercrime refer to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.

The full text of the submission by Canada can be found at www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[26 May 2015]

Cuba shares the concern expressed in resolution 69/28 that information technologies and means can potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and may adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure of States to the detriment of their security in both civil and military fields.

Resolution 69/28 also places emphasis on the need to prevent the use of information resources or technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes.

In this regard, Cuba expresses its great concern over the covert and illegal use, by individuals, organizations and States, of the computer systems of other nations for the purpose of attacking third countries, because of its potential for triggering international conflicts.

Joint cooperation between all States is the only way to prevent and tackle these novel threats and to avoid cyberspace from turning into a theatre of military operations.

The use of telecommunications with the declared or hidden intent of undermining the legal and political order of States is a violation of internationally recognized norms in this area and can give rise to tensions and situations that are not conducive to international peace and security.

The Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean, at the second Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), held in Havana in January 2014, proclaimed the Latin American and Caribbean region to be a zone of peace, in order to, among other objectives, foster cooperation and friendly relations among themselves and with other nations, irrespective of differences in their political, economic, and social systems or development levels, to practice tolerance and to live together in peace with one another as good neighbours.

At the third CELAC Summit, held in Belén, Costa Rica, on 28 and 29 January 2015, member States highlighted the importance of information and communication technologies, including the Internet, and innovation as tools to encourage peace and promote well-being, human development, knowledge, social inclusion and economic growth, underscoring their contribution to improving the coverage and quality of social services. The peaceful use of information and communication technologies in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law was also reaffirmed and it was stressed that these technologies should never be used with the purpose of subverting societies or creating situations that could promote conflicts between States.

Nevertheless, those efforts are threatened by the constant radio and television broadcasts transmitted by the Government of the United States against Cuba, in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and various regulations of the International Telecommunication Union. Furthermore, and of no less significance, these broadcasts violate the sovereignty of Cuba.

Cuba reiterates that the use of information as propaganda or for the purposes of destabilization, with the aim of subverting the internal order of other States, violating their sovereignty and meddling and interfering in their internal affairs, constitutes an illegal act and must cease.

We reiterate our strongest rejection of the use of information and communication technologies in a manner contrary to international law, and all actions of that nature. We stress the importance of guaranteeing that the use of these technologies is fully consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and internationally recognized standards of coexistence between States.

Cuba reiterates that international cooperation is essential for confronting the dangers associated with the misuse of information and communication technologies. Cuba also highlights the importance of the International Telecommunication Union in the intergovernmental debate on cybersecurity issues.

Cuba hopes that the new context of bilateral relations between Cuba and the United States, announced on 17 December 2014 by Presidents Raúl Castro Ruz and Barack Obama, including the decision to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries and to begin a process aimed at normalizing relations, will bring those aggressive policies to an end, and that the economic, commercial and financial embargo that has caused serious damage to the Cuban people will be lifted. The embargo has had a harmful impact in the area of information and communications, among other aspects of the daily life of the Cuban people.

As a part of the computerization programme in Cuba, the first national workshop on computerization and cybersecurity, on the theme "Becoming a computerized society", was held from 18 to 20 February 2015. More than 11,500 information and communication technologies professionals from all over the country attended the event. The issue of the security, monitoring and handling of information and communication technologies was one of the topics covered.

Cuba has established the Council of Computerization and Cybersecurity, directed by the highest State body, the Government and the Communist Party of Cuba. Its purpose is to recommend, coordinate and oversee the comprehensive policies and strategies for this process. Work is also under way to set up the Computer Users Union of Cuba.

Cuba supported resolution 69/28 and will continue to contribute to the peaceful global development of information and telecommunications technologies and their use for the good of all humanity.

El Salvador

[Original: Spanish]
[21 April 2015]

The Armed Forces of El Salvador, within the context of information and telecommunications security, have centralized public-network-independent voice, video and data telecommunications. A perimeter information security team has been acquired and configured; in addition, there is an encryption system for handling official information in order to protect all information from any external agent that may attempt to infiltrate the system, as well as from cyberattacks.

Georgia

[Original: English]
[26 May 2015]

The Government of Georgia puts information and cybersecurity high on its political agenda and considers addressing cyberthreats an integral part of the national security policy, especially in view of widespread e-government reforms throughout the country and the increased dependence of its critical infrastructure on information and communications technology tools. Voicing those concerns, and in order to strengthen information security, the Government of Georgia has introduced several strategic, legal, organizational and institutional measures.

The first strategy addressing cybersecurity at the national level is laid out in the cybersecurity strategy and action plan for 2013-2015, which is the principal

document outlining the State's policy in the area of cybersecurity, including strategic goals and guiding principles, and laying down action points and tasks. Cybersecurity is one of the main priorities of the State's security policy, and the protection of cyberspace is considered as important for national security as the protection of land, water and airspace.

A further step in institutionalizing information security was the establishment of the Data Exchange Agency of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, in 2010, as a central government entity responsible for the development and implementation of information and cybersecurity policies and standards, tasked in particular with:

- Adopting and implementating information security policies and standards in the public sector and critical infrastructure
- Carrying out a cybersecurity mandate though the creation of a national computer emergency response team
- Providing consultancy services in information and cybersecurity, performing information security audits and providing cybersecurity services
- Carrying out awareness-raising activities on information and cybersecurity

The legal and regulatory framework of Georgia on information security is composed of the Information Security Act and its supplementary subnormative acts adopted between 2011 and 2012. Major concepts used in Georgian legal acts detailing information security policies derive from the 27000 series of standards of the International Organization for Standardization. The law underlines certain rights and obligations for critical infrastructures in the process of implementing information security policies and lays down cooperation mechanisms with national governmental computer emergency response teams.

Georgia has taken important steps in building international cooperation and sharing accumulated knowledge with its partners. A notable example is a number of bilateral cooperation agreements and memorandums of understanding between the Data Exchange Agency and European Union Military Staff (from Austria, Estonia, Poland, etc.) as well as neighbouring countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Republic of Moldova, Turkey, etc.).

Georgia acknowledges the increased importance of regional and international cooperation mechanisms in order to address information security challenges. In that perspective, much effort should be directed to extend the number of international events dedicated to those topics of high importance, increase the level of trust with major stakeholders, and continue to work on strategic doctrines and legal concepts with the engagement of the international community.

Germany

[Original: English]
[27 May 2015]

An open, free, secure and reliable Internet offers great opportunities for economic growth, social development and scientific progress, as well as for the promotion of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. At the same time, concerns are growing about risks for international security emanating from cyberspace. Recent months have seen an increase in malicious software activities

against highly visible targets, such as media outlets. Attacks against critic[illegible] infrastructures, in particular, could have severe consequences.

An all-out "cyberwar" seems unlikely at present. However, the limited use of cybercapabilities as part of a larger war-fighting effort, including in the context of hybrid conflicts, has become a reality. In addition, incidents in cyberspace may escalate into real-world conflict.

Germany advocates a three-pronged approach to manoeuvre in that environment: agreeing rules of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, engaging in confidence-building and increasing cyberresilience.

The United Nations is the crucial forum for establishing the rules of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. An important starting point is the consensus of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security of 2012-2013 that international law, particularly the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable in cyberspace. The Group of Governmental Experts of 2014-2015, in which Germany has once again been actively engaged, has built on this.

A shared understanding of the rules, norms and principles of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace could enhance international transparency and predictability, thereby contributing to peace and stability. It would be useful, for example, to have a better common understanding of how the law on armed conflict applies to the use of those military cybercapabilities that more and more States are developing.

Concerning confidence-building, Germany attaches the utmost importance to regional organizations. In 2013, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe agreed on an initial set of cyberconfidence-building measures. Implementation is proceeding well and negotiations are under way for a second set, which would address trust-building and cooperation. As part of its upcoming chairmanship of the organization, Germany plans to prioritize cybersecurity.

Germany is working on an information technology security act to increase cyberresilience at the national level. The draft text of that act defines minimum requirements for the information technology security of critical infrastructures. It establishes an obligation to report significant incidents with a view to improving the overall security of systems and public protection in general. Germany also offers support to other States in increasing their capacity to manage cybersecurity risks.

The full text of the submission by Germany can be found at www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/.

Netherlands

[Original: English]
[29 May 2015]

The international community has a shared interest and responsibility to ensure that cyberspace remains open, free and secure. In the view of the Netherlands, security would be served by the broad acceptance of and adherence to a set of norms of responsible behaviour of States. Much work has been done already by the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. However, the

following areas would benefit from further work and the following concrete measures:

- Enhancing States' understanding of how existing international law and norms for the rules of conduct for States apply to cyberspace, particularly the international legal framework that applies to cyberoperations that do not rise to the threshold of an armed attack
- Defining norms or additional measures of self-restraint or mutual assistance, particularly the idea to establish special normative protection for certain systems and networks, including critical infrastructure providing essential civilian services, civilian incident response structures and certain critical components of the global Internet
- Strengthening the legal, diplomatic and policy capacity and the exchange of best practises in the field of international peace and security in cyberspace. The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, which was launched in The Hague during the fourth Global Conference on Cyberspace, can play an important role in this respect

As the Internet has become a strategic asset for all of us, broad international discussion on those topics is needed. The Netherlands will remain actively involved in helping to promote that dialogue.

The full text of the submission by the Netherlands can be found at www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[3 June 2015]

Information and communications technologies today are expanding rapidly. As a result, technology and communications are gradually becoming a more accessible part of the daily life of all Panamanians.

It is a fact that our lives are now linked to these developments in how communications are sent and how information is processed.

The Government of Panama has acted in accordance with this trend, adapting it to the specific needs of this security agency. For that reason, it has been carrying out technological improvements to establish more efficient and secure connectivity.

As part of these improvements, the Government of Panama has gradually been developing a communications implementation plan, which includes network, security and telephony elements. These elements comply with international standards, as confirmed with their manufacturers.

The Government of Panama protects the integrity of its information in the area of the Internet, data and telephony by means of infrastructure based on internal firewall platforms and through connection with the national multiservices network.

The Government of Panama uses secure firewall-mediated data sessions in order to ensure the confidentiality and protection of information.

We consider that as increasingly advanced telecommunications solutions are adapted to the security requirements of security agencies, those agencies will have access to tools that foster harmony in the field of information, based on both active and preventative measures. Security agencies should take advantage of this technological situation, given that we have the mission of protecting society at the local and international levels.

Peru

[Original: Spanish]
[30 June 2015]

General appreciation of the issues of information security by the Information Technology Department

The corporate data network of the Peruvian National Police maintains control over its different systems through various security policies at different levels of its organic and functional structure.

- With regard to information security, the corporate data network has been outsourced through the managed security service, which is run by a security operations centre.
- Role and identity engineering work is planned; this will allow unique access control for users, ensuring traceability and providing audit tools.

Efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security

Preventive measures:

- Designation of network administrators
- Staff training in information technology
- Software licensing for the servers of the National Police data centre
- Implementation of the "private cloud"
- Information backup
- Implementation of redundant electrical system (uninterrupted power supply)
- Upgrading of electrical distribution panels and electrical connections
- Outsourcing of perimeter security (external) in the event of attacks or denial of service.

Content of the concepts mentioned in the title of the resolution

- Upgrading of the National Police technological platform and the police information systems, which are aimed at consolidating the information means that effectively help to improve national public security, as well as contributing to international security through the availability of services that ensure interoperability between countries.

Possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level

- Standardization of communication media, including with regard to the type of equipment and communication protocols
- Standardization of a technology platform guaranteeing high availability, dedicated to interoperability among countries involved in international security
- Standardization of information security mechanisms
- Within the concept of "field of information", definition of risk factors existing in each country involved in international security and the possibility of establishing common goals with regard to what should be combated and/or curbed, with the creation of automated information mechanisms. For example, in the case of the Peruvian State, such issues as drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, money laundering and trafficking would be included.

Portugal

[Original: English]
[24 April 2015]

In its resolution 69/28 on the developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, the General Assembly recalled the role of science and technology in the context of international security, recognizing that the developments in those areas could have civilian and military applications. While progress in the fields of information and telecommunications means more opportunities for the development of civilization, cooperation among States, the enhancement of the creative potential of humankind and the circulation of information in the global community, on the other hand, we find that those technologies and means can potentially be used for purposes inconsistent with international stability and security, and may adversely affect the national integrity of States.

In the same resolution, the General Assembly called for the contribution of Member States in four areas, taking into account the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (A/68/98), namely:

(a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;

(b) Efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and to promote international cooperation in this field;

(c) The content of the concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems;

(d) Possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level.

The report of the Group of Governmental Experts contained recommendations in the following areas: norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour of

States: confidence-building measures and the exchange of information; and capacity-building measures.

Following those recommendations, we can describe our national context as follows.

Norms, rules and principles that characterize the responsible behaviour of States

Portugal considers that security in network information is important and has been increasing.

We must highlight the increasing efforts to implement legislation in network security and integrity, through the adoption of risk-assessment methods, which require the introduction of adequate cooperative security measures, at the technical and organizational levels, and the reporting of security violations or integrity loss that have a significant impact on the provision of services.

At the conceptual level, it is important to reinforce the idea that regulation should stem primarily from international rules.

At the international level, it is important to increase information-sharing and the conduct of training exercises in the field in border areas.

Confidence-building measures and information-sharing

It is crucial to promote information-sharing among all stakeholders (both public and private), taking into account the wider context of globalization.

At the national level, our efforts have been focused on the conduct of joint exercises in which public and private entities have participated, the promotion of technical standardization and the holding of conferences and seminars, some of which with the participation or international speakers.

Capacity-building measures

It is important to introduce capacity-building measures. Nevertheless, there are difficulties relating to the training and maintenance of human resources connected to those activities.

There is a need to facilitate the access to knowledge and to promote collective training in several areas, including security, among all the major stakeholders.

Qatar

[Original: Arabic]
[24 June 2015]

The State of Qatar continues to monitor existing and potential threats in the field of information security. It has set forth strategies to confront such threats in a manner consistent with the need to maintain the free flow of information. The State of Qatar believes that information security is crucial for national and global security. With a view to maintaining information security, the State of Qatar has taken a range of measures to update relevant technologies and improve legislation, regulation and enforcement. It also works to coordinate and cooperate on relevant issues at the regional and international levels, provided that domestic laws allow.

The State of Qatar believes that the international community can contribute to information security by continuing to work towards a binding international instrument to safeguard information security. Such an instrument should provide for the development of hacker-proof programmes and maintain the coherence of information systems.

Republic of Korea

[Original: English]
[11 June 2015]

Today, cyberspace is a new horizon with endless possibilities, offering unprecedented economic and social benefits. However, on account of its open, anonymous and borderless nature, cyberthreats are emerging as a serious challenge to international security.

The Republic of Korea has been experiencing a series of cyberattacks, including the recent attacks on its nuclear power plant operator in 2014. To respond more effectively to cyberthreats, the Republic of Korea introduced comprehensive plans to enhance cybersecurity posture in March 2015 and created the post of presidential secretary for cybersecurity affairs. The Republic of Korea firmly believes that it is important to agree on a set of international norms applied to cyberspace and implement confidence- and cybercapacity-building measures.

In that respect, the Republic of Korea welcomes the results submitted in 2013 the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, which recognized the possibility of applying international law to State behaviour in cyberspace, and it expects further discussions on how the agreed principles can be applied to State behaviour in cyberspace. The Republic of Korea hosted the Asia-Pacific Regional seminar on International Law and State Behaviour in Cyberspace in 2014, together with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, providing an opportunity for countries in the region to discuss cybersecurity-related matters.

The Government of the Republic of Korea has also worked to strengthen bilateral and trilateral cooperation with key countries and is actively participating in regional and international forums on cyberissues, such as the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Group of Governmental Experts of the United Nations. As the host of the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace held in 2013, the Republic of Korea closely cooperated with the Netherlands in preparation for the Global Conference on Cyberspace held in the Hague in 2015, and it will continue its contribution to the London Process Conferences.

The full text of the submission by the Republic of Korea can be found at www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/.

Spain

[Original: Spanish]
[29 May 2015]

Spain considers that information and communication technologies provide essential support for all societies worldwide, but their globalization entails serious risks and threats such as cyberespionage, cyberterrorism, "hacktivism" and cyberwarfare.

Following the establishment of the National Cybersecurity Council, Spain has continued to make progress in the development of plans derived from the National Cybersecurity Strategy to increase prevention, protection, detection, analysis, response, recovery and coordination capacities in the face of cyberthreats.

Spain continues to participate actively in the promotion of international cooperation and is closely monitoring all strategic initiatives that affect cybersecurity, both in the European Union and in major international forums such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Council of Europe.

Spain continues to uphold the importance of the United Nations in the process of achieving international consensus on cybersecurity issues and supports the holding of institutionalized dialogue, which should include other international forums, to promote regional cooperation and the establishment of global standards, best practices, rules of conduct among States and confidence-building measures, with the ultimate goal of guaranteeing the peaceful and secure use of information technologies.

Spain considers that States should achieve consensus in four areas. First, they should develop confidence-building measures of a cooperative nature with the ultimate goal of promoting transparency among States in the area of cybersecurity and strengthening their capacity to neutralize any possible attacks identified as coming from third countries.

Second, Spain considers that States should continue reflecting on how the principles and norms of international law should be interpreted and applied in cyberspace; especially those relating to the threat or use of force, to humanitarian law and to the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.

Third, Spain considers that international cooperation should be strengthened by improving channels of communication, establishing mechanisms for the coordination of Computer Emergency Response Teams, carrying out joint exercises and other similar operations, and promoting judicial and police cooperation mechanisms.

Finally, capacity-building in countries where it is needed should continue to be encouraged and assistance should be provided to recipient States for the development of national laws establishing cybersecurity standards.

The full text of Spain's submission can be found at http://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[Original: English]
[29 May 2015]

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland welcomes the opportunity to respond to General Assembly resolution 69/28 entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", and its present submission builds on its response to resolution 68/243 in 2013. The United Kingdom uses its preferred terminology of "cybersecurity" and related concepts throughout its response, to avoid confusion given the different interpretations of the term "information security" in this context.

The United Kingdom recognizes that cyberspace is a fundamental element of critical national and international infrastructure and an essential foundation for economic and social activity online. Actual and potential threats posed by activities in cyberspace are of great concern. Our response details national and international approaches that have been and will be taken in order to strengthen security and promote cooperation in this field. Those approaches have been underpinned by the national cybersecurity strategy of the United Kingdom, published in November 2011.

The United Kingdom continues to take a leading role in the international debate on cybersecurity. We have provided experts for all four Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and consider that the consensus report of the previous Group showed valuable progress in reaching common understandings on norms of State behaviour in cyberspace and in affirming the applicability of international law in cyberspace. We look forward to the outcome of the current Group's discussions in June 2015. The United Kingdom also welcomes continued discussion of potential future confidence-building measures in cyberspace at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to build on those successfully negotiated in 2013, and similar work in other regional organizations.

The present response outlines the work of the United Kingdom to support and improve cybersecurity and share best practice, both domestically and worldwide, including working with international partners to tackle cybercrime and major incidents and building cybercapacity and capability. The United Kingdom looks forward to seeing further progress in all of those areas. The United Kingdom is pleased to be actively engaged in those important issues and looks forward to further participation in strengthening capability and international cooperation on cybersecurity.

The full text of the submission by the United Kingdom can be found at www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/.